1. The word limit for various submissions is as follows:

• Long Articles – 3000 – 5000 words
• Short Articles – up to 3000 words
• Legislative Notes – 1500 – 2000 words
• Case Comments – 1500 – 2000 words
• Book Review – 1000 words

2. The submission shall be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 300 words which briefly highlights the key issues, research methodology and the conclusion, along with five relevant key words.
3. All submissions should be in 1.5 line spacing, font size 12 (for text) and 14 (for heading) and should follow the Times New Roman style. The method of citation which is expected to be followed is the Harvard Bluebook 19th Edition.

Retired Supreme Court Judge, Justice Chockalingam Nagappan has been appointed as the Chairman of Tamil Nadu’s reconstituted State Law Commission.

The tenure of the last Law Commission had ended on February 9. The reconstituted Law Commission would reportedly comprise of a retired High Court Judge and a retired Law Secretary to the Government as two full-time members, retired District Judges as two part-time members, and the Law Secretary as the full-time Member Secretary. The Commission would have a tenure of three years from the date of assumption of charge by the Chairman.

Justice Nagappan was a junior under veteran lawyer and former Attorney General of India K. Parasaran. He was recruited as District and Sessions Judge in 1987, and was later sworn in as a Judge at the Madras High Court in 2002. He also served as Chief Justice of Orissa High Court in 2013, before being elevated as a Judge of the Supreme Court on July 19, 2013. He had a tenure that lasted 1172 days, before retiring on October 3 last year.

The Vacation Bench of the Supreme Court, comprising Justices R.K.Agrawal and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, on Friday, June 16, issued notice returnable in four weeks, on an appeal against the Allahabad High Court’s April 7 judgment, (Vivekanand Tiwari v Union of India), quashing the University Grants Commission’s 2006 Guidelines requiring application of reservation, treating the University as a “Unit”.

The High Court has held that reservation is to be applied department-wise or subject-wise treating it as a “Unit” and not the University as a “Unit”. The High Court faulted the UGC for applying its guidelines in a blanket manner, without considering why non-interchangeable posts have been clubbed in for treating them as a cadre/unit.

The High Court reasoned that if the University is taken as a Unit for every level of teaching and applying the roster it could result into some departments/subjects having all reserved candidates, and some having only unreserved candidates. Such proposition would be discriminatory and unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, it held.

The High Court, therefore, quashed Clause 6(c) and 8(a)(v) of the UGC Guidelines 2006 and the letter of the UGC dated 19.2.2008, to the Universities, to follow the Guidelines, while applying reservations, and the advertisement released by the Benaras Hindu University applying reservation in tune with these UGC Guidelines, and the letter.

A sessions court in Goa on Friday passed an order restraining the publication of the court proceedings in the rape case against Tarun Tejpal, founder of Tehelka magazine.

Additional sessions judge Vijaya D Pol passed the order while allowing Tejpal's application, filed through eminent criminal lawyer Pramod Kumar Dubey, seeking in-camera proceeding of the case to preserve the dignity, respect and privacy of both prosecutrix and his client Tejpal.

Tejpal appeared before the sessions court in Mapusa on Friday.The court commenced the hearing on arguments on framing of charges against Tejpal in the rape case instituted against him.

Dubey, who is leading the defence, sought discharge of his client Tejpal.

The court, while allowing the application, restrained the publication of the court proceedings.

Tejpal is facing trial after his junior colleague accused him of sexual assault during an event in Goa in 2013.

Himachal Pradesh High Court has recently held that right to Sanitation has been now virtually accepted as constitutional right as fundamental rights like right to water, right to health, right to healthy environment, right to education and right to dignity are directly related to right of sanitation.

A Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Sandeep Sharma held that in view of ever expanding definition of right to life, citizen of the country are certainly entitled to civic amenities and medical aid, during the course of his/her travel, which he/she undertakes, by whatsoever mode of transport, on the State/ National Highways.

“Bare necessities of life includes proper sanitation facilities as the practice of open defecation or a life with polluted drinking water source and environment cannot be considered as a life of dignity as understood in the context of Right to life under the constitution”.

The Bench also observed that with large number of pronouncements having been made by various constitutional courts of this country, more particularly, Supreme Court, Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects right to life as a fundamental right, wherein its meaning/scope has been considerably expended by the judicial pronouncement, as a result of which, enjoyment of life and its attainment including the right to life with human dignity has been imparted as a basic fundamental right of citizen of the country

Public Toilets In Highways

While dealing with another Case, Justice Sanjay Karol, called the status report qua the availability of various sanitary facilities, if any, on the National/State Highways in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The Government informed the Court that on a broad estimate, more than 500 buses daily ply in the State of Himachal Pradesh. Then the Court has registered this matter as a PIL.

In the aforesaid background, the Court was of the definite view that State is under obligation to provide basic amenities to the citizens of the country while ensuring that their right of sanitation is not defeated. Definitely, citizens travelling on the State/National Highways, need to be protected from open defecation, untreated disposal of waste into streams and contamination of water supplies, which could be caused by the heavy influx of tourists and lack of proper amenities in the State.

The Court held that the non availability of public conveniences on the State as well as National Highways in the State of H.P. shall further add to pollution in the State of Himachal Pradesh. Apart from above, Himachal Pradesh being most favourite fascinating tourism destination is bond to receive lots of tourist from various States of Country as well as other parts of world.

“The situation is alarming and in case adequate steps are not taken by the respondents-State immediately, great damage would be caused to the ecology of the State and apart from above, there may be out of break of epidemic which may cause serious threat to the resident/citizens of the State”

The Court held that it is required to be done at war footing by the respondents to provide public convenience on the State as well as National Highways that too at after certain distances.

The Court has issued the following suggestions;

i). Public toilets can be constructed at places, which could be easily located by the public at large and in this regard sign boards of “ Public Toilets” or “ Private Toilets” should be displayed;

ii) Free services should be provided in cases of public toilets and charges could be prescribed for private toilets and in all toilets, staff should be provided to take care and maintain the same;

iii) The facilities should be easily accessible by the ladies walking or driving on the roads, and they are not be dangerous or inconvenient place, so as to encourage its use by the ladies;

iv). The facilities should have proper disposal system for disposal of sanitary napkins;

v). It is necessary to ensure the safety and security of women, proper action should be taken against the male members/attendants, if they are found sitting outside the ladies toilets in a drunken state.

vi). Authorities may also consider it to make it necessary/mandatory for all the Dhabas/ Restaurants on the highways to make available public toilets for the use of general public, rather authorities while granting permission to such Dhabas/ Restaurants shall consider incorporating specific conditions with regard to provision of toilets and rest rooms and to maintain hygiene of the same, failing which their registration/permit to carry out the business could be cancelled.

vii) Apart from above, there is emergent need to provide medical aid on the highways at appropriate places, so that immediate relief/help is provided to the commuters/travelers in the event of emergency. Needless to say, such medical aid centres aid should be well equipped so that best possible first aid is provided on the requirement basis.

viii). Authorities may also involve Driver/ Conductor driving their vehicles on these highways in this campaign by specifically directing them to stop their vehicles at a place where commuters/ travelers can avail facility of toilet apart from taking refreshment;

xi) Authorities may also involve public sector undertaking or private operators in the State of H.P.in this campaign, who come forward to render their help in the greater public interest;

x) To engage with Active Civil Society organizations, active individuals as they are key elements that may improve the success rate of campaigns at grassroots level.

Every lawyer has an ethical responsibility to provide legal services to those who cannot afford it. Today, as the number of lawyers and law firms increase, the numbers of those who are in need of legal services, but do not have access to them has also risen. Several jurisdictions cast some form of legal responsibility on the lawyers to provide pro bono services. For instance American Bar Association Model Rule 6.1 provides that ‘every lawyer should aspire to render at least (mandatory) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.’ Indian Law Minister, Mr. Ravishankar Prasad recently announced that weightage will be given to lawyers who provide free legal services to poor, in judicial appointments for High Courts and Supreme Court.

However, the level of commitment of lawyers to fulfill their professional responsibility of carrying out pro bono service differs. Also the different stakeholders in the system have different levels of motivation to see a sound pro bono practice in place. The clients, irrespective of their ability to pay, expect quality legal services. The law firms, including the big and small players, may take up pro bono service either as a way to train their new associates, or to set up a reputation as ‘do gooders’ or may really be committed to carry out pro bono work. There are also a few legal aid lawyers and officers who may help clients in a variety of ways because they are mandated to do so as part of National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) or State Legal Services Authority.

There are several themes in the background of the debate on pro bono practice. For instance, the cost of pro bono work and who should pay for it is one concern. How if at all can the gap between the demand and the supply of legal services be filled is the bigger question. What should be the role of firms in providing pro bono services could be another question to look into. Recognizing that there are these different themes and challenges underlying the pro bono debate, I have chosen to focus on one strand of this debate in this piece viz. - what are the different models for pro bono practice at law firms? I intended to sample law firms across different regions in the world to understand if and how the geographical differences play a role in the pro bono practice of law firms. This question emerged in part due to my observation of the differences in pro bono practice in different jurisdictions. I got my basic legal education in India, where I had a chance to work with the top law firms. I then went to United Kingdom to study at University of Oxford and while doing so, met several partners at UK firms and interned with a law firm at Oxford. In the United States of America, I had a different experience in talking to people as regards the pro bono practice of law firms. Therefore, through this research, I want to understand the differences in the pro bono practice of firms across geographical regions.

1. Interviewees And Scope Of The Research

I interviewed the associates at 1 Nigerian firm, 1 Turkish firm, 1 Indian firm, 2 USA firms, and a consultant who has been working on this issue for many years. These were the formal interviews conducted telephonically but I also want to acknowledge the several informal conversations with my colleagues who have worked in law firms in different parts of the world. Due to confidentiality concerns, the names of the firms cannot be disclosed. In interviewing the people at the firm, I tried to focus on interviewing Associates who have been at the firm for a while but not for too long. The aim was to get as much non-biased information as possible and speaking to partners, I thought might lead to biased responses. But I also spoke to 2 people who have been working on this issue amongst others for many decades, to ensure that this research paper encapsulates their experiences.

The scope of this project was limited to finding the factors internal to a law firm, that make the difference in whether or not it has a substantial pro bono practice. There were a few questions in the questionnaire that did take into account external factors for specific purposes. For instance one of the question related to whether or not a mandatory legal requirement by the government to do a certain number of pro bono hours is a good idea. This was to understand whether such a policy will be effective and also the perspectives of the lawyers at firms towards any such mandatory requirements. But largely this project focuses on factors that are internal to the workings of a firm in the strength of its pro bono practice. 

Main Findings

This section discusses the main findings of my research as regards the differences in the pro bono practice of law firms.

• Spectrum Of Institutionalization

First, there is a difference in the level of institutionalization of the pro bono practice at law firms. I found that there is a spectrum of institutionalization ranging from firms which have no institutionalized culture of pro bono practice and firms which have a fully functional, systemic and institutionalized pro bono practice, with other firms ranging in between with some institutional factors.  In India, all lawyers are on their own in terms of carrying out pro bono as a result of which no one does it at a regular basis. There is no institutionalization, even in the biggest firms. In Nigeria and Turkey, I saw some institutionalization. So litigating lawyers as opposed to corporate lawyers usually take up pro bono clients who are mostly individuals but sometimes non-profit organizations too. Only a handful of lawyers perform pro bono. The two US firms are known for their pro bono practice where around 75% or more lawyers around all offices perform a minimum of 20 hours and up to 50 hours of pro bono work. The clients are usually on a retainer basis, these are non-profit organizations. These firms also have programs outside pro bono practice whereby they take up different charitable causes. This is not to suggest that all firms in USA have an institutionalized pro bono practice. Nothing will be further from truth but the point is that USA is also home to firms which have relatively much better institutionalized pro bono practice at law firms than some of the other countries.

• Key Differentiators In The Success Of Pro Bono Practice

Secondly, a key takeaway was to understand, what makes some firms undertake more pro bono than others? There are three key factors I found which resonate with some of the things we have discussed in this class.

• Commitment of top leadership to pro bono practice

Firms can have a good or a not so good pro bono practice. The fact is that any amount of time and resources devoted to or directed towards pro bono practice is time and resources taken away from billable work. Therefore at some level, there is an inevitable conflict of more pro bono work and more billable work. Therefore, a key differentiator in understanding why some firms have more pro bono practice than others is to see the level of personal commitment of the leadership, including either the vision of the founding partners and/or the continued commitment of new leadership to ‘contributing to the good of the society.’

• Culture of the firm and the country where pro bono is practiced

Just like a restaurant with many clients attracts even more, and a firm doing good business attracts even more business, the firm that is doing more pro bono seems to do more with every passing year. It is the overall culture of the firm and the region which makes more and more people takes increasingly more pro bono work. The US firms which have strong pro bono practice have 70 percent or more lawyers taking up pro bono work up to 20-50 hours. This contrasted to a culture where only a handful of lawyers take up pro bono work is reflective of the internal culture and perceptions of the lawyers towards pro bono practice. At the former firms, pro bono is looked upon favorably and more lawyers want to do it. This is unlike in firms which have a culture of passing on the pro bono work either to junior most lawyers or to lawyers in particular domains of law, implicitly suggesting how much value those firms attribute to lawyers who do pro bono work [‘Workplace policies’ in Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, Oxford University Press, 2004 p. 168]. In short, culture counts and the overall culture of the firm influences in the pro bono practice of the firm.

• Incentive in terms of counting the pro bono hours the same as billable hours, recognizing pro bono hours for bonuses and other recognitions

This point makes all the difference in the pro bono culture of the law firm. If the firms consider pro bono work the same as billable work, by granting similar recognition to lawyers when calculating salaries, bonuses etc., then that sends out a very strong signal that the firm is serious in its commitment towards pro bono practice. So, firms that have a structured pro bono practice are those who have made a strategic choice about it, with a clear vision towards a strong pro bono practice. Aric Press mentioned during the interview that law firms consider pro bono work not just as a way to train the lawyers but also to keep up their motivation in a market that is being disrupted in more ways than one. Some firms have awards in place for associates who perform the maximum number of pro bono hours. But more than the awards themselves, it is a sense of community, ability to choose public interest work akin to one’s interests, easy and efficient administrative procedures in place to find out about the pro bono opportunities in the firm are some of the incentives that make a difference.

• Recommendations

Having explored some of the factors that are key differentiators in determining what makes some firms better at pro bono practice, this section looks into what can firms do moving forward to further strengthen their pro bono practice. It is important to note that all lawyers I interviewed without an exception think that their firms can do more towards pro bono practice. This includes law-firms that are already world leaders in the pro bono practice models.

However, most of them noted that any attempt from the government to introduce a mandatory policy of a certain number of minimum pro bono hours will frustrate the cause more than supporting it [Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono In Civil Cases : The Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 Maryland Law Review 78, 97-99 (1990); Debra Baker, Mandating Good Works: Colorado Proposal Requiring Pro Bono Draws Fire From Most Lawyers, 85 ABA Journal 22 (1999)]. This is for a variety of reasons but most notably, it will mean that a lot of lawyers will only do pro bono to check the box so to say and the quality of pro bono work may be compromised. Secondly, this may prove a hurdle to promote an out of box thinking on part of the firms to come up with community programs, and other public interest projects which cannot be directly measured in terms of a certain number of hours. A lot of firms do have these programs in place, where they host events, programs, etc. to raise awareness about a certain cause. But the self-interest of firms against having a mandatory requirement cannot be lost sight of when discussing this issue. The policy regulators or the government can very well argue another side of this issue. This argument suggests amongst other things that mandatory requirements ‘would support the many lawyers who would like more pro bono involvement, but who are in workplaces that fail to provide adequate resources or credit for such work.’ [Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, Oxford University Press, 2004 p. 188]. Also any mandatory requirement need not be necessarily for requiring a particular number of hours for pro bono service. It can also include that lawyers report their contributions to legal aid and public interest causes or that they make a minimum donation etc.

One suggestion that three out of the six lawyers I interviewed made is that there is a need for more collaboration amongst the law firms to help reach out to more clients who need legal services. In other words, if the law firms can pool their resources and talent, then they can leverage their collective power to take up more impactful projects, more number of projects etc. and serve the clients better.

One thing that the firms can work towards, going forward is the concept of triage. Deriving from the French verb trier, meaning to sift, separate or select, it is a concept that is usually applied in medicine to prioritize the patients depending on the severity of their wounds. Even though some of the law firms are doing admirable pro bono work, it is no where sufficient in the light of the demand for legal services by the weaker sections of the society. Therefore, given the wide gap between the providers of the pro bono legal services and the sheer numbers of those who are in need of it, law firms can explore the possibility of applying the concept to triage in determining which clients to serve. Most law firms I interviewed prefer providing legal services to non-profit organizations, who are usual their clients on a retainer basis. But perhaps devoting resources towards determining what kind of clients most need their legal services could be helpful in achieving maximum impact with limited resources. This is not to suggest that determining which clients’ priorities should be given a higher value is an easy task, would be far from truth. This is why this remains a recommendation in its nascent stage, that needs further research. But why of a concrete suggestion, firms can form a research team to look into ways of collaborating and applying the concept of triage to the clients who come to them, by pooling their resources.

Much has been done towards developing the models of pro bono practice but clearly a lot more remains to be done.

Avani Bansal is an Advocate practicing in the Supreme Court of India. She has pursued her B.A.LL.B from HNLU, Raipur and Masters in Law from University of Oxford and Harvard Law School. Write to her at advocateavanibansal@gmail.com.

The High Court of Madras on Friday reportedly directed self-financing medical and dental colleges for Post Graduation courses of Pondicherry University to admit medical students under the State quota before June 19.

The Bench comprising Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice Sunder further directed the colleges to collect a provisional fee of Rs. 10 lakh for clinical courses, before classes begin from June 20. The students have been directed to submit the fee to the Centralized Admission Committee, until such fee is fixed by the Fee Committee. The order has also proposed setting up of a committee to oversee fee-related matters.

“The admission of students in medical institutions as also fee charged by such medical institutions are ex-facie the matters of immense public importance. This Court cannot shut its eyes to impediments in the way of individual litigation by young students. This Court can take note of the facts pleaded by a public spirited citizen in a public interest litigation and suo motu pass orders to redress the grievances of the student community. Moreover, we are informed that separate writ petitions have also been filed by and/or on behalf of affected candidates”, said the Bench.

The Court is hearing a petition filed by Chennai based lawyer Mr. V.B.R. Menon, demanding a declaration that the fee structure for self-financing medical and dental colleges for Post Graduation courses shall be fixed by the Puducherry Fee Committee.Mr. Menon has alleged that the committee has so far only fixed the fee for 3 such colleges. As a result of such lapse, the colleges are demanding huge amounts of money from the candidates.

Allowing the interim order the Bench held;

“Considering that the future of the students who are admitted pursuant to this interim order remains uncertain, there is an immense urgency and we expect that the University Grants Commission (seventh respondent) and Ministry of Human Resource Development (sixth respondent) shall forthwith constitute a Committee to regulate the fees chargeable by the self-financed deemed Universities, after giving all stakeholders including the Universities adequate opportunity of representation. The decision of the Fee Committee shall abide by the result of the writ petition” 

Order 

We, therefore, deem it appropriate to pass an interim order directing the deemed Universities to admit the students provisionally selected and successful in the admission tests/counselling to the vacant seats in order of their merit, subject to the condition that the students shall each deposit Rs.10.00 lakhs at the time of admission towards the annual fee for the first year with CENTAC (third respondent) and subject to the further condition that in the event the fees determined by the Fee Committee that may be constituted by the University Grants Commission (seventh respondent) and Ministry of Human Resource Development (sixth respondent) to study the fee structure of the deemed Universities is higher, they shall pay the differential amount. Needless to mention that those students who have already taken admission by depositing the full fees will, if necessary, be entitled to refund/adjustment of the difference between the fees that might be determined by the Committee and the amount paid by them. Such admission shall be effected within 5 P.M. on 19 th June 2017 and the students will be allowed to provisionally attend their classes from 20 th June 2017. 

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) has notified the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Fast Track Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2017.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has notified the relevant sections 55 to 58 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy code,2016 pertaining to the Fast Track Process and also notified that fast track process shall apply to the following categories of corporate debtors:

• a small company, as defined under clause (85) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013; or
• a Startup (other than the partnership firm), as defined in the notification dated 23^rdMay, 2017 of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; or
• an unlisted company with total assets, as reported in the financial statement of the immediately preceding financial year, not exceeding Rs.1 crore.

The new regulations provide the process from initiation of insolvency resolution of eligible corporate debtors till its conclusion with approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority.

The process in these cases shall be completed within a period of 90 days, as against 180 days in other cases. However, the Adjudicating Authority may, if satisfied, extend the period of 90 days by a further period up to 45 days for completion of the process.

A creditor or a corporate debtor may file an application, along with the proof of existence of default, to the Adjudicating Authority for initiating fast track resolution process. After the application is admitted and the interim resolution professional (IRP) is appointed, if the IRP is of the opinion, based on the records of corporate debtor, that the fast track process is not applicable to the corporate debtor, he shall file an application before expiry of 21 days from the date of his appointment, to Adjudicating Authority to pass an order to convert the fast track process into a normal corporate insolvency resolution process.

Perhaps for the first time since India became the Republic, the post of Attorney General of India has been lying vacant for nearly five days, since June 12, as the outgoing AG, Mukul Rohatgi finished his term on June 11.

Although Rohatgi wrote to the Government last month expressing his desire not to be considered for another term as the AG, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) – comprising the Prime Minister and the Minister for Home Affairs - approved the extension of his term, along with that of other law officers, namely, the Solicitor General, Ranjit Kumar, and Additional Solicitor Generals, Maninder Singh, P.S.Narasimha, Tushar Mehta and Pinky Anand.

Subsequently, with Rohatgi going public on his request to the Government not to be considered for another term because he wants to return to private practice, the Law Minister Ravishankar Prasad has said the Government would respect his wishes, even though it is satisfied that he completed his term with distinction.

The list of Law Officers as on June 8, uploaded in the website of Department of Legal Affairs, shows Rohatgi’s term as having expired on June 11. The terms of the Solicitor General, Ranjit Kumar, and of the four Additional Solicitors-General, Maninder Singh, Tushar Mehta, P.S.Narasimha, Pinky Anand, have been renewed from June 7 “until further orders”. Interestingly, although the previous term of Pinky Anand was to expire only on July 6, her fresh term begins on June 7, implying that it has been extended one month in advance.

It is now confirmed that the term of the ASG, Paramjit Singh Patwalia, has not been extended, although it expired on June 6. Patwalia now resumes his private practice as he has reportedly requested the Government not to extend his term, which has been accepted by the Government. During the first two years of the Narendra Modi Government, Patwalia has reportedly submitted to the Law Ministry, more number of requests for permission to represent private parties, than other law officers.

The terms of four more ASGs are expiring on July 27, but there is no news on whether they and the Government would agree to their extension. They are G.Rajagopalan (Madras High Court), Anil Chandrabali Singh (Bombay High Court), Sanjay Jain (Delhi High Court), Rajdeepak Rastogi (Rajasthan High Court and its bench at Jaipur).

The term of the ASG, Ashok Mehta (Allahabad High Court and its bench at Lucknow) expires on October 16, and he may have to soon make up his mind whether to agree to a fresh term.

There are five more ASGs attached with the High Courts, whose terms expire on April 7 next year. They are K.M.Nataraj (Bangalore, Southern Zone), Satya Darshi Sanjay (Patna), Satya Pal Jain (Punjab and Haryana High Court), Prabhuling K.Navadgi (Karnataka High Court) and Kaushik Chanda (Calcutta).

ASG, Atmaram N.S.Nadkarni (Supreme Court), who began his term on May 10 last year, has his tenure up to May 9, 2019.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, in the exercise of its powers under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, has notified the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Inspection and Investigation) Regulations, 2017.

Under these regulations, the board shall have the power to conduct inspections of records of such service providers as may be decided by it, in order to ensure that records are being maintained by the service provider and to ascertain that the services are not unfit or ineligible and fulfill all obligations under the regulations.

The regulations also lay down the procedure of inspection, such as the requirement of a notice at least 10 days prior to the commencement of the inspection.

However, this requirement can be done away with in certain circumstances like when the notice would cause undue delay, or would lead to alteration, falsification, etc of records. The regulations also have provisions for the submission of an interim and a final report of inspection.

Further, the regulations also provide for investigation of a service provider under Section 218 of the code. The board can direct the investigating authority to conduct investigation of the affairs of the service provider.

Procedure for conducting the investigation, such as requirement of a notice 10 days prior to the commencement of the investigation, has been provided for in the Regulations. However, this too can be done away with in certain circumstances. Provisions for the submission of an interim and final investigation report also find mention in the Regulations.

The Regulations also provides for the issuance of a show-cause notice and the requirements for a valid show-cause notice.

Embarrassed by the nature of questions asked during her cross-examination, a 5-year-old victim of sexual assault took the help of a baby doll that was given to her “in order to keep her occupied”, to answer questions. 

Case background

The case at hand was registered against a 23-year-old man named Hunny. He was booked under sections 323 and 363 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act.

By an order dated April 19, 2016, Hunny was sentenced to suffer 5-year rigorous imprisonment and fined Rs. 5,000.

He filed an appeal before the Delhi High Court and the case came up for hearing before Justice SP Garg.

The case was first registered based on the statement of the victim child’s brother, who himself was only 10 years old, at the time of the incident.

According to the prosecution, the victim and her 10-year-old sibling were going to school on July 21, 2014, around 9 am.

The appellant, Hunny, kidnapped the girl after distracting her brother with a Rs. 10 note.

He then took her to Police Colony, Narela, and sexually assaulted her and also slapped her.

Thereafter, the victim was spotted by her neighbour at Gol Chakkar in Pratap Nagar and was brought home to her parents.

After the victim’s brother told the Court that the accused was wearing a pink shirt and blue jeans at the time of kidnapping, the victim was cross examined.

Following dialogue occurred during the cross examination that was recorded in-camera.

Q: Beta kya hua tha (Dear, what had happened?)

A: Ek ladka mujhe pakad kar le gaya tha. (A boy had taken me away.)

Q: Beta, kab pakad kar le gaya tha?  (When did he take you away?)

A: Jab bhai mujhe school chodne gaya tha. (When my brother was coming to drop me to school.)

Q: Beta, phir kya hua? (What happened then?)

The court observed (The victim did not answer despite repeated questions. She was holding the baby doll in her hands and she started putting one of her finger of right hand in the lower wear of the doll).

The doll was taken on record as Ex. P1. (Hereinafter referred to as ‘doll’ for the sake of convenience).

Q: Beta, kya uss ladke ne aapke saath wahi keya tha jo abhi aap doll ke saath ker rehe ho? (Beta, did that boy do the same thing that you are doing to the doll?)

A: Haan (the child started scratching the vaginal region of the doll with her nails). (Yes)

Q: Beta, kya uss ladke ne aapko waise hi nakhun mare the jaise aap doll ko maar rahe ho? (Beta, did the boy scratch like you are scratching the doll?)

A: Haan (The child had all of a sudden become numb and was not responding to further questions. She was again made comfortable by the Ld. Addl. PP and the Ld. Advocate from DCW). (Yes)

Q. Beta, phir kya hua? (Beta, what happened then?)

A. Woh mujhe bus mein Pratap Bagh chod gaya. Uss ladke ne mujhe gaal par thapad bhi mara tha.

Court observation: The Ld. Addl. PP has asked questions w.r.t the clothes being worn by the witness at the time of incident and as to whether the accused having removed the same and the place where the same was done. The witness, despite repeated questions, has answered only to the effect that the accused had put her skirt in her school bag.

Thereafter, the victim correctly identified the accused and was unable to answer certain questions which, the court observed, were too difficult for the child to understand and respond too. She was also asked whether she was being coaxed by her parents to say all this, which she denied.

Justice Garg observed: “Scrutinizing the testimony of the tiny child, it stands established that the appellant had kidnapped ‘X’ when she had accompanied her elder brother to the school. No discrepancies or infirmities have emerged in her cross-examination.

True, the child was hesitant to respond to some questions put at the time of recording her statement. Obviously, the child was reluctant to answer embarrassing questions which were derogatory in nature. The court can understand shyness of tender aged girl to answer dirty or vulgar questions. She has given answers to other questions. Nevertheless, she had categorically pointed out as to what the appellant had done with her by referring it to the doll in her hand. She had conveyed as to what was done by the appellant with her. Nothing more can be expected from a child aged around five years considering her limited understanding.”

The CCTV footage submitted before the court also corroborated the prosecution’s case as it showed a boy matching the said description kidnapping the victim who was in school dress.

Noting that the trial court had already taken a lenient view and sentenced the accused for a minimum period of 5 years, the court dismissed the appeal.

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The Bombay High Court has restrained Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd (GCMMF), which markets ice cream under brand name Amul, from broadcasting two television advertisements as they were disparaging towards plaintiff’s product, Kwality Walls.

According to plaintiffs Hindustan Unilever Ltd (HUL), the said advertisement disparages Kwality Walls, a rival to Amul. It is a negative campaign asking consumers not to have frozen desserts, instead have Amul.

In the 87-page judgment, Justice Kathawalla noted that in years 2012-2013, Amul started a campaign by distribution of pamphlets setting out the difference between frozen dessert and ice cream. These pamphlets state: “Usse real milk wala Amul ice cream khilayein, Vanaspati tel wala nahi"

Senior counsel Virag Tulzapurkar appeared for the plaintiffs while senior counsel Ravi Kadam appeared for the defendants.

Although the defendants (Amul) claimed that they do not in any manner, defame, denigrate or slander either frozen desserts or the plaintiff's products, they laid emphasis on the fact that the manufacturers of frozen desserts continued to describe their product as ice cream in violation of S. 53 of the Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA) 2006, despite the introduction of Regulation 2.1.7 in 2011 by the Food Safety and Standards (Food Products Standards and Food Additives) Regulations, 2011, separately classifying ice creams and frozen desserts under the larger head: "Dairy-based deserts/ confections".

This contention was deemed as incorrect.

Justice Kathawalla noted that the distinction between frozen dessert and ice cream existed even prior to 2011-12.

 It was first introduced in June, 2005, by an amendment to the regulations framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

Law laid down in these following cases was examined by the court:

(i)  Godrej Sara Lee Ltd vs Reckitt Benkiser (I) Ltd

(ii)  Dabur India Ltd vs Colgate Palmolive

(iii) Annamalayar Agencies vs VVS & Sons Pvt Ltd. & Ors

(iv) Godrej Consumer Products Limited vs Initiative Media Advertising

(v)  Eureka Forbes Ltd vs Pentair Water India

The court specified that it is necessary to examine as to when disparagement of a product can be said to have taken place and the entitlement of a manufacturer of a product to sue for disparagement of its product when an entire class of products is disparaged.

Upon examining the law laid down in the aforementioned cases, Justice Kathawalla observed:“Even if there is no direct reference to the product of the plaintiff and only a reference is made to the entire class of products in its generic sense, even in those circumstances, disparagement is possible.”

Finally allowing the notice of motion filed by HUL, the court said:“I once again clarify that it is not only because of the words 'Vanaspati' and 'Vanaspati tel' being used in the impugned TVCs, that this Court has come to the conclusion that Defendant No. 1 is guilty of disparaging the entire category of Frozen desserts which includes the products manufactured by the Plaintiff under the said category, but the Court has reached the said conclusion after considering the content, intent, manner and storyline of the impugned TVCs, which seen as a whole convey a false, untruthful, malicious and negative message that frozen desserts contain vanaspati (which is perceived as unhealthy) are not pure, are inferior to ice creams, not meant to be given to children, is not the right choice and should not be purchased.”

The Supreme Court’s Vacation Bench of Justices R.K.Agrawal and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, on Friday, June 16, allowed the withdrawal of the Special Leave Petitions against the Delhi High Court’s November 27, 2015 judgment holding that Cipla had infringed Roche’s patent over the lung cancer drug, erlotinib hydrochloride.

The bench allowed the withdrawal on the ground that the matter has been compromised by and between the parties.

“In view of the averments made in I.A. No.2 of 2017 supported by an affidavit, I.A. No.2 of 2017 is allowed and Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.7664-7665 of 2016 are dismissed as withdrawn”, the bench noted in its order.

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising Justices Pradeep Nandrajog and Mukta Gupta, had held in its judgment that Cipla had infringed F.Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd’s patent in the lung cancer drug sold under the trade name, Tarceva. Roche was selling Tarceva at Rs.4800 per tablet whereas Cipla marketing its generic version under the name Erlocip at the cost of Rs.1600 per tablet.

In 2012, a single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed Roche’s plea for interim injunction against Cipla on the ground of public interest, considering that the disputed patented drug is life-saving. Roche’s patent was granted in February 2007 by the Indian Patent Office. Cipla had contended that Roche’s patent had not complied with full disclosure requirements as required under Section 8 of the Patents Act, 1970, and sought its revocation. This was refused by the Single Judge during the trial. Both Cipla and Roche appealed against the Single Judge’s order before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

The Division Bench, however, did not grant the injunction prayed for by Roche against Cipla as the life of the patent would expire in March 2016. But it imposed a cost of Rs.5 lakh on Cipla.

Cipla’s lawyer, Namrita mentioned the matter before the Supreme Court’s Vacation Bench on Friday, bringing the settlement to its notice, and their decision not to pursue the SLP.

The joint statement from Roche and Cipla reads as follows:

“Cipla and Roche/OSI confirm that they have reached an agreement regarding the ongoing patent disputes relating to the anti-cancer medicine Erlotinib Hydrochloride. As part of the agreement, the companies have ceased all relevant patent litigation on this product and Cipla has acknowledged the validity of the patent rights of Roche.”

But the compromise agreement has not been made public. Observers, therefore, say that the settlement should be reviewed for potential competition law implications, and unless these terms are available, they cannot be unraveled.

An Indian Tripartite Delegation, led by the Minister of State for Labour and Employment (Independent Charge), Shri Bandaru Dattatreya participated in the 106th Session of International Labour Conference (ILC) was held from 5-16th June 2017.

In a historic step towards eradication of Child Labour from the country, India ratified International Labour Organizations Convention No 138 (minimum age for employment) and Convention No 182 (worst forms of child labour) to symbolise its commitment and initiatives for eradication of child labour and attainment of Sustainable Development Goal 8.7 related with curbing of child labour. The ratification of both conventions coincided with the International Day against Child Labour expressing country’s commitment along with global partners to fight the menace of child labour and providing the childhood back to them.

With ratification of these two core ILO conventions, India has ratified 6 out of 8 core ILO conventions, with the other 4 core ILO conventions relating to abolition of forced labour, equal remuneration and no discrimination between men and women in employment and occupation, thus reaffirming its commitment for promoting and realizing fundamental principles and right at work. This action is in sync with the Government’s broader intent for social equality and growth for all.

Ratification of these 2 core conventions by India has not only national but international ramifications for eradication of child labour as it means that almost all children (99%) in the world are covered by Convention 182, while coverage of Convention 138 enhanced from approximately 60 percent to almost 80% of the world’s children population. India is the 170th ILO Member State to ratify Convention No 138, which requires States to set a minimum age under which no one shall be admitted to employment or work in any occupation, except for light work and artistic performances. Similarly, for Convention No 182, India is the 181st member state to ratify and reaffirm its commitment for the prohibition and elimination of worst forms of child labour, including slavery, forced labour and trafficking; the use of children in armed conflict; use of children for prostitution, pornography and in illicit activities ( such as drug trafficking); and hazardous work.

A landmark step in the endeavour to have a child labour free society was the enactment of the Child labour (Prohibition and Prevention) amendment Act, 2016 in August 2016 that provides for complete prohibition on employment of children below 14 years in all occupations and processes and prohibits employment of adolescents (14-18 years) in hazardous occupations and processes. The age of admission to employment has been linked to the age of compulsory education under Right to Education Act (RTE), 2009.

In order to facilitate compliance of the provisions of the Act, Government of India has also notified the amendment in the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Central Rules which provide broad and specific framework for prevention, prohibition, rescue and rehabilitation of child and adolescent workers.

To meet the objective of child labour free society, the National Child Labour Project (NCLP) has been aligned with changes in the Act. NCLP is a rehabilitative scheme for child and adolescent labour. Under the scheme, children are provided bridge education, vocational training, mid-day meal, stipend, health check-up etc.

The High Court of Madras on Friday issued notice to the Central Government on a Petition challenging Sections 156 to 189 of the Finance Act, 2017 and the Tribunal, Appellate and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017. The notice was issued by a Bench comprising Chief Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice M. Sundar.

Sections 156 to 189 of the impugned Act amend provisions relating to structuring and re-organisation of tribunals. The Petition contends that these provisions are not matters relating to Money Bill and hence, should have been legislated through separate legislations and bills, with the assent of Rajya Sabha.

“In other words, the Lok Sabha has firstly certified a Financial Bill as a Money Bill and thereafter adopted the special procedure laid down for Money Bills in Article 107 of the Constitution and effectively negating any sort of interference from the Rajya Sabha and Council of States. It is thus submitted that when proceedings which are tainted on account of substantive illegality or unconstitutionality, the same cannot be immune from judicial scrutiny and review. Since the Finance Bill, 2017 was wrongly voted as a Money Bill despite the fact that it is not, the passing of the Finance Bill, 2017 is illegal, invalid and a fraud on the Constitution,” it contends.

The Petition submits that the Rules pertaining to the appointment, qualification and removal and other terms of services of members of tribunals amount to excessive delegation of legislative functions. It points out the fact that the parent legislations for the Tribunals permit amendments to be carried out by the Parliament. Section 184 of the Finance Act, however, empowers the Centre to frame new Rules in this regard, and amend the same by way of notification. This has been termed as “delegation of essential judicial functions”.

Rules 7 and 8 provide for removal of retired Judges of High Court and Supreme Court, who are appointed to tribunals, by the Central Government after a departmental inquiry. This, the Petitioner contends, is violative of Article 50 of the Indian Constitution, which provides for separation of powers of the judiciary and the executive.

Further, the tenure of Presidents of all Tribunals has been reduced to three years. This has been contended to be in violation of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Union of India v. R Gandhi.

The Rules have, therefore, been challenged on the ground that they are “void, defective and unconstitutional, being violative of doctrines of separation of powers and independence of judiciary which are parts of the basic structure of the Constitution.”

Therefore, praying for quashing of the provisions and the Rules, the Petition contends, “The present Finance Act, 2017 insofar as it amends the structure and re-organisation of various Tribunals including the 19 Tribunals set out in the Schedule of the Impugned Rules, 2017 is unconstitutional and violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. The impugned provisions and the Impugned Rules, 2017 violate the principles of separation of powers which is not only part of basic structure but also an elementary component of the rule of law.”

Central Information Commissioner, Prof. M Sridhar Acharyulu, in the case of Subhash Chandra Agrawal v. PIO, Department of Sports, declared the BCCI to be a public authority and directed the Board to disclose information sought by the RTI applicant.

In this case Subhash Chandra Agarwal, the complainant, had sought information regarding whether or not the PMO was aware of the disparity in the prize money awarded to cricket players and hockey players and regarding the accountability of the BCCI. The detailed questions on which information was sought are as follows:

1. “Whether Honourable Prime Minister/PMO is aware of dissatisfaction expressed by national hockey-players winning Asian Champions Trophy on just Rs 25000 award-money announced by Hockey lndia?
2. Is Honourable Prime Minister/PMO aware that Indian cricketers winning World Cup Final were given Rs. 2-crore award money by Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI) after cricketers felt dissatisfied on earlier announcement of Rs. one crore, that too in addition to bumper-awards by state-governments and others?
3. Complete and detailed information on action taken to remove such vast disparity in award-money for national players of cricket and others.
4. Complete and detailed information on award-money paid to sports persons by Union government in last three years.
5. List of sports bodies (with addresses and names of office-beaters) registered with Union government.
6. Is it true that irregularities have been reported about some sports-bodices?
7. If yes, steps taken to action taken on such irregularities reported against sports bodies, and also to check any such probable irregularities in future. The RTI application was made to the CPIO of PMO, who vide letter dated 5-10-2011, transferred to the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports.”

The CPIO contended that as per the government’s policy to declare every national sports federation as a public authority, BCCI too is a public authority. However, no response was given to the complainant’s query as to why BCCI, being a public Authority, isn’t disclosing information as per Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act. The complainant also sought to know why the BCCI was still using the logo from the British raj days instead of switching to a truly national symbol like the tricolor or the Ashoka Chakra.

The Justice Mudgal Committee had, in 2014 while probing the IPL scam, had highlighted the need for a special legislation to make all malpractices in sports a criminal offence. The PMO asked the Youth and Sports Affairs Department to consider whether a standalone Act was needed or whether the IPC could be sufficient to deal with malpractices in sports. However, beyond this consultation with the Law Commission, no progress has been traced in the matter.

The Minister of Youth and Sports Affairs, while answering an un-starred question, stated that in 2010, the Government had conferred the status of public authorities to all National Sports Federations receiving a grant of Rs. 10,00,000 and above. Further these Federations discharge state-like functions while performing tasks such as national team selections and regulating the sports in the country. The BCCI has been considered to be a National Sports Federation and represents the country in various international events. However, the BCCI does not directly receive any grants from the government, but does enjoy certain privileges like concessions in income tax and customs duty by the central government and allocation of lands to Cricket Associations by the State governments. BCCI received tax exemptions as a charitable institution till 30.06.2006.

The Commission took into consideration the aforementioned contentions and noted that the government’s decision to categorically award the status of a public authority to BCCI is reflected in the thousands of crores of tax exemptions that the Board enjoyed and the representation of India in international events. This is a clear grant of monopoly to BCCI over the Cricket in India.

The Lodha Committee, in order to facilitate transparency in the functioning of the BCCI suggested “that clear principles of transparency be laid down, and the BCCI website and office will carry all rules, regulations and office orders of the BCCI, the constitution of the various committees, their resolutions, the expenditures under various heads, the reports of the Ombudsman/Auditor/Electoral Officer/Ethics Officer and the annual reports and balance sheets.”

The Commission further noted that since BCCI enjoys a monopoly over cricket, it is bound to disclose information to the citizens under the RTI Act.

The Commission directed BCCI to answer the questions raised by the complainant, in pursuance of its obligations under Section 4(1)(b) of the Act.

• Commencement of Registration- 20.06.2017
• Release of Moot Problem- 01.07.2017
• Last Date for Registration- 20.07.2017
• Last Date for Seeking Clarifications on Moot Problem- 20.07.2017
• Release of Clarifications- 31.07.2017
• Submission of Memorandum- 25.08.2017
• Announcement of shortlisted teams- 20.09.2017
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• Oral Rounds- 28.10.2017- 29.10.2017
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President Pranab Mukherjee rejected mercy petitions from five death-row convicts, on May 25 and 26. These are perhaps his last disposal of mercy petitions, before his term expires on July 24. With these, he has rejected mercy petitions of 41 death-row convicts, whereas he has commuted the death sentences of only seven, to life imprisonment.

On May 25, he rejected the mercy petitions of Jitendra @ Jeetu, Babu @ Ketan, and Sanni @ Devendra. The Supreme Court dismissed their appeals against their death sentences, confirmed earlier by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench), on January 6, 2015 in limine, through an order pronounced by the bench of the then Chief Justice H.L. Dattu, and Justices A.K.Sikri and R.K.Agrawal.

The order just carried three words: “Delay condoned. Dismissed”. The Supreme Court, while hearing the landmark Shatrughan Chauhan case, had decried the practice of in limine dismissals by the Supreme Court of appeals by death-row convicts.

According to the Death Penalty India Report Volume 1 published by the National Law University, Delhi, last year, there have been nine in limine dismissals of SLPs filed by the death-row convicts in the Supreme Court since 2004. The bench, which dismissed Jitendra, Babu and Sanni’s SLPs in January 2015 also dismissed in limine, another SLP filed by Babasaheb Maruti Kamble, in the same month.

In limine dismissals, because they lack reasoning, are legally indefensible, and the death-row convicts have a fair chance of getting their appeals reheard by the Supreme Court on this ground.

Interestingly, the review petition filed by Jitendra @ Jeetu and other convicts, is yet to be heard by a three-Judge bench in open court as mandated by the Supreme Court’s Constitution bench in Mohd. Arif case. It was last listed before Justice Kurian Joseph in Chambers on October 5, 2015, when he directed that the applicants in the case shall also be heard when the Review Petition is heard in the open Court.

In their Judgment, Justices S.K.Seth and P.K.Jaiswal of the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, (authored by Justice Seth), had held that the accused, by their extremely depraved and demonic acts against an infant of three or four years, hae forfeited the right to be treated softly or lightly. “So long as the death sentence remains on the statute book, it would, in our opinion, be a travesty of justice to award the lesser sentence of life to the accused”, the bench had observed.

According to the High Court, the prosecution has made out two very important circumstances against the accused. They are the DNA report and the seizure of documents from the spot per seizure Memo. “These two circumstances by themselves in our opinion, build a chain of circumstances leading to the one and only conclusion of the involvement of all the three accused persons before us”, the bench had held.

Last rejection

The President rejected the mercy pleas of Purushottam Dashrath Borate and Pradeep Yeshwant Kokade, on May 26. Their appeals against the death sentences were dismissed by the Supreme Court’s three-judge bench on May 8, 2015. The judgment was authored by the then Chief Justice, Dattu, on behalf of himself and justices S.A.Bobde and Arun Mishra.

The two accused in this case were found guilty of sexually abusing and killing a BPO employee, on her way to work in Pune, in 2007. The accused were part of a private cab service, hired by the deceased’s employer to pick up employees from their homes, and drop them, after their work shifts were over.

The Supreme Court confined the hearing of their appeals to only the issue of sentence.

The bench observed that in a case where the accused does not act on provocation or on the spur of the moment, but meticulously executes a deliberate, cold-blooded and pre-planned crime, giving scant regard to the consequences of the same, the precarious balance in the sentencing policy evolved by our criminal jurisprudence would tilt heavily towards the death sentence. The incident, the bench held, shocked and repulsed the collective conscience of the community and the court. As a result, the bench found no mitigating factor in favour of commutation of their death sentences to life imprisonment.

Mercy Petitions

Whatever the findings of the Courts, the President is expected to apply his mind independently while exercising his powers under Article 72 of the Constitution.

Eminent scholar and statesman, Gopalkrishna Gandhi, observed in his book, Abolishing the Death Penalty, (Aleph, 2016) as follows: “The president is bound by the Government’s advice, but the subject –the life and death of an Indian citizen –makes it possible for the President, and I would say incumbent on the President to go into each such case with a magnifying glass. And this not just to spot loopholes of fact, but also to see the crime against the light of circumstances, and contexts that lie beyond purely legal facts and legal interpretations” (pages 47-48).

Gopalkrishna Gandh, further observed: “Presidential inclinations cannot form the final gradient to the gallows. A mercy petition cannot be at the mercy of one man’s temperament, albeit filtered by governmental advice. That is valuationally abhorrent in a democratic republic governed by the rule of law.”

He continues: “In the provisions of Article 72 lie a certain philosophy, inadequately explained, that requires the executive study of a mercy petition to be trans-judicial, but not un-judicious, to be a large canvas but not a tabula rasa for presidential expressionism. No man’s life can be left to the mercy of another man’s discretion. Raisina Hill is not the Purana Qila, nor Rashtrapati Bhavan the Red Fort.” These are indeed strong words.