In an important decision, the Bombay High Court has held that medical clinics, nursing homes, hospitals and dispensaries that employ 10 or more persons will come under the purview of the newly amended Maharashtra Shops and Establishments Act, 2017.

Justice RK Deshpande and Justice Vinay Joshi of the Nagpur bench were hearing a writ petition filed by Dr. Pradeep Arora, who is a paediatric surgeon running a nursing home in Nagpur. The bench upheld the vires of the newly amended Act.

Case Background

Arora challenged the definition of “establishment” under Section 2(4) of the Maharashtra Shops and Establishments (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 2017, brought into force with effect from September 7, 2017, to the extent it applies to the profession and the establishment of any medical   practitioner (including hospital, dispensary, clinic, polyclinic, maternity home and such others) and the amendment requires such an establishment to comply with the provision of Section 6 in respect of its registration with the facilitator if the employees engaged are ten or more, and under Section 7, intimation of it to be given if the strength of the employees engaged is less than ten.

The challenge was on the ground that it violates the right of the petitioner contained in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India to practise a profession or to carry on any occupation or business.

Submissions and Judgment

The petitioner appeared in person, former AG and senior advocate Sunil Manohar was appointed the amicus curiae in the matter to assist the court, whereas Advocate-General AA Kumbhakoni appeared on behalf of the State.

Sunil Manohar relied upon various case laws to explain the position of law in this matter. He relied on the decision of apex court in the case of Dr. Devendra M. Surti v. State of Gujarat, 1969, and the decisions of the high court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Dhanlaxmi Meisheri and Narendra Keshrichand Fulandi and another v.  State of Maharashtra.

AG Kumbhakoni submitted that the state government took a stand that the activity covered under the new Act has now to satisfy three tests –

(i)  There should be systematic activity,

(ii) Organized by cooperation between employer and employee, and

(iii) For the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes.

The court accepted the AG’s interpretation and said-

“In our view, it is the harmonious activity carried out in cooperation amongst all the partners in the establishment to render material services to the community with the help of capital, which is covered by the definition of “establishment” under Section 2(4) of the new Act. Whether the establishment is running in profit or loss is of no consequence.  We find that Shri Kumbhkoni is right in urging that it is a matter of legislative policy and wisdom as to the types of establishments to be included in the definition.”

Thus, the court found that such medical establishments, clinics and dispensaries that employ 10 or more persons come under the purview of the new Act-

“Section 1 of the new Act, is designed to bring only such establishments, which partake the character of an industrial establishment. It would not be a matter of exaggeration on our part if we call this provision as the backbone of the new Act. The legislation has taken care to maintain the distance between the activity carried on by an individual by his personal skill and intelligence and those carried on or organised by cooperation between the employer and the employee in rendering material services to the Society.  We find this to be in conformity with what is expressed in relation to commercial establishment by the Apex Court in Dr. Devendra Surti's case.”

The court concluded that the petitioner’s fundamental rights were not being violated in any manner and upheld the vires of the newly amended Act.

The Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Cr.P.C.] was subjected to significant amendments in 2009. The law on arrest was drastically altered following Supreme Court admonition, and victims were given a real foothold in the criminal process for the first time. Amidst all this, a provision was added to the section on Bail in the Cr.P.C.: Section 437-A. What does it say?

Before conclusion of the trial and before disposal of the appeal, the Court trying the offence or the Appellate Court, as the case may be, shall require the accused to execute bail bonds with sureties, to appear before the higher Court as and when such Court issues notice in respect of any appeal or petition filed against the judgment of the respective Court and such bail bonds shall be in force for six months [Section 437-A(1)]

Through this post, I will try and convince the reader that Section 437-A Cr.P.C. is unconstitutional. The post first cursorily explains the concept of bail and engages with the problematic consequences flowing from the text of Section 437-A. It then discusses the origins of the provision, before moving on to argue that it is contrary to Articles 14, 19, and 21. The last section considers that there are two options, reading down Section 437-A or striking it down completely, and I support the latter course.

Understanding Bail and the Text of 437-A One often comes across “bail” in context of criminal trials and investigations. What does this mean? In such scenarios (and others), where a person is in the crosshairs of the legal system, the law wants to ensure that legal proceedings are not frustrated by persons fleeing the jurisdiction. An obvious way to address this is to arrest everyone. But that is hardly proportionate to the needs of law enforcement and is far too heavy a strain on State resources.

Bail is the answer to this problem. The person is notionally still in the custody of the court and not at liberty, but is not actually in fetters. Note, that as the law would always need a guarantee of personal appearance, all defendants once in the crosshairs of the system are either on bail or in custody. How does it ensure appearance when required? By imposing certain conditions while releasing the person, chief among which is a requirement to appear in court or before the police. Non-compliance with the conditions is met by the threat of arrest, often along with a threat of imposing financial consequences such as forfeiture of property to the State. The financial threat often extends to other persons called “sureties”, who are thus incentivised to ensure the defendant does not flee.

Now, consider the text of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. It is very broad: the court shall require bail bonds, with sureties, before conclusion of trial and disposal of appeal. This throws up a bunch of questions. First, does it mean that the court will not proceed with the trial or appeal before getting such bail bonds? Second, if the court does proceed with the trial / appeal and finds the defendant innocent, would she then remain in custody if she cannot find sureties or comply with the other conditions imposed for bail?

Section 437-A Cr.P.C. allows for both of these eventualities. And it is for this reason that the High Courts of Bombay, Allahabad, and Himachal Pradesh have clarified that courts within their jurisdiction must not apply the provision in a way that causes either of these results to follow. There will be some states that I have missed, but I am certain that there are many others where no such clarification exists today. Nor has any guidance been issued by the Supreme Court, and so, it is very possible that both of these problematic outcomes are being seen across the country. From here on, this post will focus on the second of the two outcomes: the continued detention of persons acquitted of all charges for their failure to post adequate bail bonds.

The Genesis and Object of Section 437-A I mentioned that the guidelines issued by certain High Courts curbed certain uses of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. but have not yet explained how they wanted the provision to be applied. The Courts suggested that the provision is a means to ensure that an acquitted person is available to contest any eventual appeal by the State, and so the bail bonds should only be required at the end of a trial before judgment. They also suggest that bail might be given without sureties if an acquitted person cannot find sureties.

The history of Section 437-A supports this reading. Before it was added to the Cr.P.C. in 2009, the only other provision dealing with a need to detain persons pending an appeal against acquittal was Section 390 Cr.P.C. This empowers the appellate court to detain persons pending an appeal against acquittal, if it is convinced that of the threat of them evading the legal process. But in this scheme there still exists a period between the acquittal and appeal when a scheming defendant could still flee and frustrate the State’s appeal. Taking note of this (and abortive attempts by the Gujarat High Court to fill the gap) the Law Commission in Report No. 154 of 1996 recommended insertion of a Section 437-A Cr.P.C. Why? It said that the Cr.P.C. was “silent on the point of securing attendance” during an appeal, and there had been instances where appeals against acquittals were delayed or dismissed due to this failure in securing attendance.

Two problems are immediately apparent here. First, the Law Commission said that the Cr.P.C. was “silent” on securing attendance for appeals but did not even look at Section 390 Cr.P.C. which did cater to this need, albeit differently. Second, the bogey of appeals against acquittals being dismissed was raised without any empirical data about how many such dismissals happened and why. For instance, if the prosecution filed an appeal years after acquittal (as it often does) and then failed to find the original defendant, then it is rather unreasonable to claim that a person fled or frustrated the appeal and piggyback on the dismissal of the appeal to create a perceived need for Section 437-A. 

Importantly, the Law Commission acknowledged that this measure might be challenged under Article 21 of the Constitution. Its basis for concluding that the proposal was constitutional was simple: the Cr.P.C. allowed appeals against acquittals, and so seeking bail bonds till the limitation period for filing an appeal subsisted was not a “restraint” on personal freedom. Further, proposed Section 437-A was eminently reasonable where it involved no “restriction of liberty or his freedom of movement”.

When Section 437-A Cr.P.C. was ultimately passed by Parliament, there were two big changes from the suggested draft in Report No. 154. The final version of Section 437-A said that a court shall require bonds while the draft version did not make it a mandatory requirement. At the same time, the final version only needed the bail bonds for six months, down from the one year period that the Law Commission had suggested.

Unconstitutional Fetters on Personal Liberty Practically, Section 437-A Cr.P.C. does not make much of a difference to defendants already out on bail during trial. In such situations, it is easy to extend the period of that bail bond for six months after acquittal by changing the form of the bail bond. But Section 437-A works very differently for those defendants who are in actual custody, unable to post bail by finding sureties or complying with any financial conditions that a court might impose. It is only for these persons that the two scenarios highlighted earlier – delayed trial and delayed effect of acquittal – are possibly realised.

On the face of it, Section 437-A Cr.P.C. though seemingly neutral, is very selective in its impact and discriminates against one class of persons. The classification that it effects is purely built on levers of wealth, influence, and privilege, rather than pursuit of the object behind Section 437-A (perhaps they indirectly affect that object, at best). The effect of this discrimination is to deprive such persons of their right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, by not only possibly denying a trial itself, but more importantly, by not allowing them to enjoy the liberty that is the natural concomitant of an acquittal. Thus, Section 437-A in its present form offends the equality guarantee of Article 14.

Actual confinement of a citizen after acquittal obviously curtails the freedom of movement that she is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d). But both the legal and actual fetters on personal liberty curtail the fundamental right that Article 21 protects. Which means we must consider whether Section 437-A Cr.P.C. is protected by the tests governing restrictions of these fundamental rights.

Section 437-A Cr.P.C. contains no sense of proportionality. It does not require the State to satisfy a court that an acquitted persons might possibly flee to avoid the appeal. Nor does it require the State to show that a person, if immediately released, will pose a threat to public safety. Instead, the provision demands every acquitted person to remain in custody of the court despite till the State can make up its mind about pursuing an appeal. Thus, the rights under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 are rendered subservient to administrative convenience, pure and simple. And this after a person is declared “not guilty”, after a full-length trial or appeal.

Reading Down vs. Striking Down No wonder those High Courts which have recommended that personal bonds be taken are effectively reading down the text of the provision (supported in this paper too, which discusses other issues with the provision). The constitutional problems in giving Section 437-A Cr.P.C. its fullest expression are obvious, and even the Law Commission in 2017 also suggested a relook is now necessary. But here, I argue that reading down cannot save the provision and it must be struck down altogether.

First, a question of means. Saving Section 437-A Cr.P.C. does not involve merely filling in gaps or creatively interpreting the text. It involves actively re-writing it, and that is something courts cannot do. The requirement that a court “shall” take bonds with sureties will be re-written as something it “may” do. Further, the scope of discretion is altered not to allow a court to forego the demand for bail bonds altogether, but to insert the words “personal bond” in Section 437-A to change the kind of bail bonds that are required.

But far more important is the question of principles. Section 437-A Cr.P.C. must be struck down for it automatically breaks the link between a judgment of acquittal and its legal effects, in the absence of any appeal preferred by the State. This is perhaps the most problematic part of the provision At one level, it creates a conflict within the Cr.P.C. Today, Section 354(1)(d) Cr.P.C. still states that a judgment of acquittal requires that a court direct the person be set at liberty. Without amending what it means to be acquitted directly, the legislature has indirectly rendered all acquittals subject to a condition of complying with Section 437-A. Can the legislature indirectly alter the very meaning of an acquittal at all stages within our criminal justice system in this indirect fashion? No, it cannot. Because this link between a judgment of acquittal and being set at liberty is protected through Article 21 itself. It cannot be severed, and certainly not to cater to administrative convenience.

Conclusions Perhaps I am “fetishising” what an acquittal means – after all, it is not final till confirmed in appeal. But that finality is in respect of an acquittal being legally unassailable. It does not make the effects of an acquittal automatically contingent upon the possibility of appeal proceedings. Rather, not treating an acquittal as final allows an appellate court to delay giving it effect. This delay can only occur after giving a full hearing to both sides. Any other position would deprive the verdict of a lower court of all sanctity lest it be confirmed in appeal. Moreover, it would mean that persons are condemned from the date of arrest till their case is resolved by the highest appellate court, and continue to suffer all the collateral consequences of criminal convictions for this unconscionably long period of time as well.

This is why the remedy provided by Section 390 Cr.P.C. makes sense. The state can seek detention of the acquitted person pending appeal if it can show that it is necessary, but the default is still that a person remains at liberty. Moreover, an appeal having been filed gave the court proper jurisdiction to hold someone in custody. What if, after some empirical study, it is found that something like Section 437-A is necessary to prevent persons from fleeing and frustrating appeals? Then, a hearing similar to that under Section 390 is the answer, not a position that changes the default position. If the trial court / appellate court is satisfied of a need to detain after having heard both sides it could pass appropriate orders, with the denial of liberty narrowly tailored to account for how long the State might take to file an appeal rather than simply hold persons in custody for fixed periods.

Under no situation is Section 437-A Cr.P.C. the answer. Parliament cannot pass statutes that deem an entire population to be a suspect class for administrative convenience, even after a court of proper jurisdiction has pronounced them innocent. If this is so, then the guarantee under Article 21 might soon be no better than a fig leaf.

The article was first published here

Has the Uttar Pradesh Government installed CCTV cameras to monitor police stations in the state, the Allahabad High Court has demanded to know.

Justice AR Masoodi demanded information in this regard in order to ascertain the manner in which police officials are dealing with public grievances.

The order was passed on a habeas corpus petition filed by one Rishi Kapoor, on behalf of his mother, Sudha Kapoor, alleging that the latter was illegally detained at the Aashiyana police station. His petition has demanded that she be produced before the court and be further set at liberty.

Hearing the petition, the court directed Sub Inspector Ajit Kumar, Aashiyana, Lucknow to submit a report on the manner in which the custody and welfare of the alleged detenue is being ensured. He was directed to be present in person on November 27, which is the next date of hearing.

“The Court would also proceed to consider as to whether the CCTV Cameras have been installed in all the police stations so as to have first hand information of the manner in which the public grievances are dealt with,” it further ordered. Additional Advocate General VK Shahi has been directed to assist the court in this regard.

It may be noted here that the Supreme Court had, in July, 2015, directed the Central government and all State governments to install CCTV cameras in all the prisons across the country and take a call on installing them in police lock-ups, if the circumstances so require. You may read all directions issued by the court here.

Read the Order Here

The Allahabad High Court has ordered a CBI inquiry into the death of a 29-year-old woman, who was allegedly beaten and tortured by her in-laws for dowry.

The Bench comprising Justice Bala Krishna Narayana and Justice Ravindra Nath Kakkar has directed the central agency to file the report in the case within two months.

The court was hearing a petition filed by the woman’s father, who alleged that his daughter was mentally and physically tortured by her in-laws for dowry. He claimed that she was admitted in an unconscious state on May 8 to a hospital in Gautam Budh Nagar’s Badlapur area, where she succumbed to her injuries on May 13.

Considering the question whether the investigation in the case before it was being conducted in a fair and impartial manner, the court noted the non-non-compliance with the provisions for arrest under Sections 41 and 41(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as Sections 174 (police to inquire and report on suicide) and 176 (inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death) of the CrPC.

It further noted that several applications had been filed before authorities such as the National Commission for Women and the Inspector General, but without any respite.

“In spite of submitting these applications to the various authorities, no action has been taken by the respondents, which compels the victim to file this petition against the biased and tainted investigation of the case and relief for fair and impartial investigation has been sought by way of this writ petition before us,” the court observed.

Therefore, transferring the case to the CBI, it ordered, “The Investigating Officer of this case shall hand over the case diary and the other material collected by him till date during investigation to the C.B.I. The Director of C.B.I. shall thereafter appoint an officer who shall make every possible endeavour to investigate this case in a fair and impartial manner and complete the investigation as early as possible preferably within a period of two months from the date on which he is entrusted with the investigation of this case.”

Read the Order Here

The High Court of Kerala has upheld death penalty awarded by trial court for a person convicted of rape and murder of a mother-daughter duo. The crime happened on December 2, 2007, in Idukki district.

The District and Sessions Court Thodupuzha found the accused Rajendran guilty of the double rape-murder and sentenced him to death. The crime was committed by Rajendran along with another accused Jomon, who absconded. Therefore the case against Rajendran was split up and tried separately. Both of them had ravished the victims alternately and murdered them by inflicting multiple injuries on their head with iron rod and chopper.

The judgment dated October 31 delivered by the HC Division Bench of Justices C T Ravikumar and K P Jyothindranath(since retired) considered the Death Sentence Reference as well as the appeal filed by accused Rajendran. Though there was no direct eye witness for the crime, there were testimonies which indicated the presence of accused near the house of the victims. Also, there was forensic evidence from the seminal stains, hair samples and nail clippings of the accused which linked him to the crime without leaving any room for doubt.

The HC also confirmed death penalty observing that "the commission of murder was intentional, cold blooded and brutal and it was committed after ravishing two hapless women, mother and daughter, that too in a ruthless manner from the same room". The Court also took note of the fact that one of the victims had a child aged 7 months then. "The manner in which the offences were executed, in the circumstances explained hereinbefore, we are of the firm view that they are sufficient to make the commission of the crime uncommon and at the same time tend us to believe firmly that imposition of the sentence of imprisonment for life on the appellant would be inadequate", observed the judgment authored by Justice C T Ravikumar.

The Court also held that there were no mitigating circumstances favouring the accused. The Court held that the fact that the appellant got wife and children and execution of death sentence would draw his family orphaned cannot be taken as an extenuating factor. The age of the appellant was also held to be not a mitigating factor in this case. He was aged 42 at the time of commission of the crime and presently he is around 53. Thus, following the guidelines of "rarest of rare cases" in Bachan Singh case, the HC dismissed the appeal, confirming death penalty.

Read Judgment

The Gujarat High Court recently imposed costs of Rs. 1 lakh on seven event management firms for dragging Gujarat University (GU) to the court and challenging the introduction of eligibility criteria for bidders for the lease to manage the university’s convention centre and exhibition hall.

The Bench comprising Justice AS Dave and Justice Biren Vaishnav scorned at the “unholy alliance” created by the petitioners for arguing before the court without any “justifiable reason”, and directed that the amount be deposited with the registry within ten days.

Two petitions had been filed by the event management firms—Labh Décor, 9 Square Hospitality, Shangar Décor Ltd, Resource, Deep Gandhi Associates, Cherish Events and R. Gandhi & Co.

They had not participated in the tender process, and had now contended that the modified basic eligibility and technical bid evaluation criteria, requiring consideration of turnover of the bidder for awarding marks for bid evaluation, had no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the University.

They had in fact asserted that the modifications in the eligibility criteria were introduced with the sole intention of favouring M/s. Lallooji & Sons, which had been awarded the lease.

The court, however, ruled that GU’s decision was not arbitrary, relying on several Supreme Court judgments on various facets of commercial contracts. It observed, “Even decisions making process so elaborately referred to by us reveal that the respondent No.1 has acted within four corners of law leaving no room of doubt of any arbitrariness or the decision can be said to be contrary to public interest and, therefore, we find no merit in the submissions made by learned advocate for the petitioners.”

The court then directed payment of costs of Rs. 1 lakh for each petition, ordering, “Before parting, we may note that efforts made by unholy alliance of the petitioners in filing the petitions arguing the case by taking substantial time of the Court for no justifiable reason amounts abuse of process of law, we are of the considered opinion that if we do not award cost we will be failing in our duty as other deserving cases were to be adjourned and petitioners of both these writ petitions are directed to pay Rs.1 lakh cost for each petition and to be deposited in the registry within 10 days from the date of the copy of the judgment received.”

Read the Judgment Here

The Delhi High Court has directed Rattan India Nasik Power Ltd, formerly called Indiabulls Power, to give at least 10-day notice to Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited (BHEL) in case it intends to invoke or encash its bank guarantee of Rs 263 crore submitted by the latter under phase -I of the Nasik and Amravati Thermal Power Project.

Justice Rajiv Shakdher passed the order after BHEL moved court seeking protection against possible invocation of bank guarantees in light of the financial distress Rattan India is in as it reportedly reels under a debt of over Rs 20,000 crore.

BHEL, which was represented by senior advocates Rajiv Nayar and Ciccu Mukhopadhaya along with the team from K.N. Legal, led by Kartik Nayar and comprising advocates Mohit Mahla, Rishab Kumar and Sarthak Malhotra, told the high court that it apprehends Rattan India invoking the bank guarantee in the light of financial distress and the consequent insolvency proceedings.

Rattan India, which was represented by senior advocate Dayan Krishanan, on the other hand said there has been no attempt on its part to invoke the bank guarantee.

At this, Justice Shakdher said no interference is called for by the court at this stage since the petition is based on mere apprehension but directed the respondents to give written notice of at least 10 days if it intends to invoke or encash the bank guarantee.

Rattan India has been developing a total of 5,400 MW coal-based thermal power projects comprising two 2,700-MW power plants at Amravati and Nashik, in Maharashtra.

BHEL has commissioned over units of 270 MW each in these power plants.

Read the Order Here

The Uttarakhand High Court has, while deciding a reference sent by a single judge, reiterated that “the High Court and the Court of Session have concurrent jurisdiction under Section 438 of Cr.P.C (anticipatory bail)” and that, “it is for the accused to choose the forum and the same cannot be restricted by construing the provision of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. narrowly”.

A bench of Justice Rajiv Sharma and Justice Manoj Kumar Tiwari said: “The principles of Sections 438 and 439 of Cr.P.C. (regular bail) are not para materia”.

The bench was deciding the reference sent by a single judge who doubted the views of a concurrent court which had held that provisions of anticipatory bail are guided by the principles of regular bail and that the provisions of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. were pari materia with Section 439.

While deciding the question, the division bench said, “According to plain language of Section 438 (1) of Cr.P.C, any person who has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non- bailable offence, may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session.”

“The principles of Sections 438 and 439 of Cr.P.C. are not para materia. Section 438 of Cr.P.C. is invoked by the accused who believes and is apprehending his arrest on accusation of committing a non-bailable offence. Section 439 of Cr.P.C. enables the High Court or Court of Session to enlarge a person on bail who is accused of an offence and is in custody,” it said.

The bench referred to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. vs. The State of Punjab, wherein the court drew a distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail and also held that in order to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair.

It also referred to the decision of full bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Mohan Lal & others vs. Prem Chand & others, wherein it was held that “Once the statute has given a right to a person to choose between the High Court and the Court of Session it is for him to choose the Court. The Parliament having spoken we cannot be wiser”.

In yet another case titled Y Chendrasekhara Rao & others vs. YV Kamala Kumari & others, the division bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court had in 1993 held that Section 438 CrPC confers power both on High Court and Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail and that denial of right of moving to the high court in the first instance amounts to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution.

Similarly, the Kerala High Court had in the year 2004 held in a case titled Balan vs. State of Kerala, held that “…even under Section 439 CrPC, the Legislature has conferred power to grant bail on the High Court as well as the Court of Sessions. The two provisions do not even remotely suggest that the petition has to be filed before the Sessions Court first and then before the High Court. The power to grant bail has been conferred equally on both the Courts. It is clearly concurrent. The citizen has the opportunity to approach the Court of Sessions and then the High Court. It gives him a second chance to seek bail. However, in a case where he chooses to come directly to the High Court, he cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that he had failed to approach the Sessions Court”.

The Uttarakhand High Court also referred to a recent Supreme Court judgement in case titled Barun Chandra Thakur vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & others wherein the court had held that the act of the respondent in approaching the high court directly for anticipatory bail cannot be faulted when both high court and the court of sessions have concurrent jurisdiction.

Holding that in view of the legal position, the high court and the Court of Session have concurrent jurisdiction under Section 438 of Cr.P.C and it is for the accused to choose the forum, the bench remitted the matter back to the single judge.

National Law University and Judicial Academy Assam (NLUJAA) is organising an International Conference on Climate Change: Discovering the Multidisciplinary Contours.

Dates: 9^th-10^th March 2019

Sub-Themes:

• International Dimension
• National Dimension
• Climate Change Vulnerabilities for North-East India
• Comparative Legal Framework on Climate Change- Indo-Canadian dimension

Important Dates:

• Deadline for Submission of Abstracts: 15^th November 2018
• Notification of Acceptance of Abstracts: 16^th December 2018
• Submission of Full Paper: 20^th January 2019
• Early Bird Registration Deadline: 7^th February 2019
• Final Registration: 20^th February 2019

Queries can be addressed to celar@nluassam.ac.in, or to Juri Goswami [+91-9706788987], or Adrita Bhuyan [+91-7663917434].

The brochure can be accessed here.

South Asian Law & Economics Review [SALER] invites submissions for its Volume 3, which will focus on contemporary issues of law and economics.

Word Limit: Preference will be given to submissions less than 25,000 words in length, including footnotes.

Deadline for Submission: November 10, 2018 

Publication Fee:

• Single authored: INR 1200 [USD 30 or equivalent for international authors]
• Co-Authored by 2 authors: INR 1,600 [USD 60 or equivalent for international authors]
• Co-Authored by 3 authors: INR 2,100 [USD 90 or equivalent for international authors]

Articles can be submitted here.

The call for papers can be accessed here.

The Editorial Board of the NUALS Law Journal (ISSN Number 2319-8273) is inviting submissions for its 13^th Edition. The Journal, being the flagship law review of the National University of Advanced Legal Studies, is a multidisciplinary, double-blind, peer-reviewed journal. NUALS Law Journal welcomes submissions, on any topic of law of contemporary relevance.

Who can apply?

Academicians, legal practitioners, students and researchers from the legal community.

Submission Categories:

• Articles of length 3000 to 6000 words (exclusive of footnotes; however speaking footnotes must be limited to 50 words); articles exceeding the word limit may be considered on merit.
• Short Notes (between 1000 and 3000 words)
• Case Comments (minimum of 1500 words)

 Submission guidelines:

• Submissions are to be made only in electronic form and must be sent to lawjournal@nuals.ac.in
• All submissions for the current issue must reach on or before 13th Jan 2019.
• All submissions are to contain an abstract, of not more than 250 words, accompanying the article.
• By submitting an article the author undertakes that the article is an original work and has not been submitted, accepted or published elsewhere.
• Plagiarism will result in summary rejection of the submission.
• Co-authorship is allowed for a maximum of two authors.

For further queries contact lawjournal@nuals.ac.in

The Journal of Intellectual Property Studies, published under the aegis of National Law University, Jodhpur, is inviting original, unpublished manuscripts for publication in the Winter 2019 issue of the Journal (Volume 2, Issue 2). Submissions can be in the form of articles, notes, comments and book reviews. The manuscripts must pertain to the field of intellectual property law or to related fields such as media and technology law.

Deadline for Submission:1^st December, 2018

The journal subjects all articles to a review process by student editors, prior to publication.

The journal stands by the ideals of open access to scholarly works and will be published online and made available for everyone to read and cite freely.

Manuscripts may be submitted via email to the Editors-in-Chief at jips@nlujodhpur.ac.in.

For further information, visit their website and access the first and second issues.

The Call for Papers can be accessed here.

The Editorial Board of RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) is inviting submissions for its 1^st issue of Volume 6.

RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review was set up as an academic initiative to promote research and debate in areas of financial and economic law. The review looks to understand the legal paradigm prevalent in India and South East Asia and how it affects finance and other cross border mercantile activities.

The journal aims at giving the opportunity to legal academia, research scholars, legal practitioners and students to publish work that is at the cutting edge of doctrinal, theoretical and empirical research.

Theme: The upcoming issue of RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review, i.e., Volume VI Issue I, is going to be a special edition on the broad theme of ‘Competition Law’.

Sub-themes:

• Anti-trust Issues and Price Based Abuse of Dominance;
• Arbitrability and Enforcement of Competition Law;
• Competition Law in Platform Market and E-commerce;
• Cartelisation, Jurisdiction and Adjudication Issues;
• Mergers and Acquisitions with respect to Competition Law;
• Competition Law and Big Data.

Word limit:

• Articles (4,000-6,000 words);
• Short Notes: 2,000 – 4,000 words;
• Case/Legislative Comments: 2,500 – 4,500 words; and
• Abstract: 200 – 300 words.

Submission Deadline: December 16, 2018

Submissions should be emailed to us at rfmlr@rgnul.ac.in.

For further information or clarifications, write to rfmlr@rgnul.ac.in.

The Call for Papers can be accessed here. 

The Corporate Law Society, National Law University, Jodhpur, is inviting submissions for the 3^rd Pranita Mehta Memorial Essay Competition, 2018 in memory of Ms. Pranita Mehta, a student of NLU, Jodhpur.

The Competition is open to all students pursuing under-graduate (three/five year) or post-graduate law degrees from any law school/university/college recognized by the Bar Council of India.

Topics:

• Reverse piercing of the Corporate Veil: an unexplored phenomenon in India
• Kotak Committee Report and its implementation – a step in the right direction?
• The future of cryptocurrency in India
• Fugitive economic offenders and non-performing assets – a need for banking reforms?

Important Deadlines:

• Last Date of Registration: November 30, 2018 (11:59 PM)
• Last Date of Submission of the Essay: January 30, 2019 (11:59 PM)
• Declaration of the results: Second week of March, 2019

Prize money:

• First Prize: Rs. 25,000
• Second Prize: Rs. 15,000
• Third Prize: Rs. 10,000
• Top ten submissions shall be given merit certificates

The Brochure can be accessed here.

The Alternative Dispute Resolution Cell (ADRC) of Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab and the Straus Institute of Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University, USA are jointly organising the Ratan K. Singh Essay Writing Competition on International Arbitration.

Theme: Challenges Facing International Arbitration and their Possible Solutions

Sub-themes:

• Increasing Diversity in International Arbitration
• Role of Technological Innovation in International Arbitration
• Improving efficiency of International Arbitration
• Bringing consistency and certainty in the international arbitration jurisprudence
• Erosion of principle of party autonomy in international arbitration
• Abuse of Process in International Arbitration
• Enforceability of Awards in International Arbitration
• Third Party Funding in International Arbitration
• Impartiality and Independence of Arbitrators in International Arbitration

The above mentioned list of sub-themes is merely illustrative and not exhaustive and hence, any other submission pertinent to the main theme shall be accorded due consideration.

Prizes

The following cash prizes shall be awarded to the winners:

• First Prize:INR 25,000
• Second Prize:INR 15,000
• Third Prize:INR 10,000

Submission Guidelines:

• The essays must be sent by email to adrc@rgnul.ac.in with the subject “Submission for The Ratan K. Singh Essay Writing Competition on International Arbitration”.
• The deadline for submission is 11:59 pm, 15th February 2019 (Indian Standard Time- GMT+5:30 hours). The deadline maybe extended at the discretion of the ADRC. Late entries will not be accepted under any circumstances whatsoever.
• Students and Research Scholars pursuing Under Graduate, Post Graduate and Doctoral degree from any recognized university can participate in the competition.
• Co-authorship is not permitted.
• There is no registration fee for the competition.
• In addition to the top three winners, 9 selected essays will be published in the form of an edited book with an ISBN Number.

For any queries Email at adrc@rgnul.ac.in with the subject “Query- Ratan K. Singh Essay Writing Competition on International Arbitration”. OR

• Sidharath Goyal: 7696405448
• Komal Parakh: 8427254621
• Uday Agnihotri: 9815092215
• Raghav Mudgal: 9915873281

For Brochure click here

A petition has been filed in the Bombay High Court accusing actor Shahrukh Khan and others involved with the movie of "hurting religious sentiments" of the Sikh community through the trailer of the upcoming movie ‘Zero’.

In addition to Shahrukh Khan, the petition by Advocate Amritpal Singh Khalsa has been filed against the producers of the movie—Gauri Khan and Karuna Badwal, director of the movie—Aanand L Rai, Red Chillies Entertainments Pvt Ltd., YouTube Space Mumbai, Twitter, Google, and the Chairperson and CEO of Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC).

The petition refers to the trailer of the movie, wherein Shahrukh Khan is seen wearing undergarments, with a garland of Rs. 500 notes around his neck and a Kirpan in Gatra tied around his neck and shoulder.

The petition then throws light on the historical and cultural importance of Kirpan, referring to a couple of books on the subject, and takes exception to the actor wearing Kirpan without following any “Rehat Maryada”.

Asserting that Kirpan is ripped off its historical and cultural significance and has been reduced to an “item of show piece” by the movie makers, the petition submits, “The Petitioner submits that there for any one to wear and carry kirpan it is mandatory that one should follow Sikh Rehat and Maryada, and that there is no ban for any person from any caste/creed/religion to partake Holy Amrit(Nectar), he/she is enjoined to keep Five Articles of faith always, in the instant case Respondent No.1 has not followed any Rehat Marayada, and that there is no ban on Respondent No.1 to get baptized into Sikhism, for him to wear and carry Kirpan it is mandatory to Follow Sikh Rehat Maryada, wearing Kirapn reflecting as item of Show/fashion has caused deep scars to the religious sentiments of the petitioner.”

It therefore demands that the respondents be convicted under Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, which punishes “deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs”. It further raises the following questions:

• “ Can an article of faith having utmost importance in a particular religious belief be gimmicked for public amusement?
• Can there be publicity and amusement at the cost of Fundamental Rights of citizen
• During British reign thousands of Sikh who were sent to jail for bearing kirpan, Sikhs have long history in honouring and protecting the Five Articles of faith can such an important of article faith be gimmicked for public entertainment and amusement?
• Can any person be permitted to follow ones Religious belief without following the ceremonial procedure? Will it not amount to sacrilege of the religious beliefs? and in the instant case violation of Fundamental rights? (sic)”

The petition thereafter puts forth the following demands:

1. Direction to the CBFC to not issue any certification for the movie, as it is “blasphemous in nature, hurting the religious sentiments of petitioner so too Sikh people at large”.
2. Direction to the CBFC to revoke any certification already issued.
3. Direction to the film’s producers and directors to remove the allegedly blasphemous parts from the movie.
4. Direction to the CBFC to delete the parts in the movie wherein Shahrukh Khan is seen wearing or carrying Kirpan.
5. Pending issuance of CBFC certification, constitution of a committee to view the film and present its suggestions before the court.
6. Interim injunction against uploading of any other trailer, picture or video of the movie, pending disposal of the petition.

The Indian Mediation Week (IMW) and the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (WBNUJS) are pleased to announce the 1st NUJS-IMW Essay Writing Competition 2018.

Who can apply?

The application is open to all students enrolled in undergraduate or post-graduate courses from any recognized university/college across India, research scholars in the field of law and practicing lawyers.

Themes (any one of the following)

• Commercial Mediation in India
• Need for Healthcare Mediation in India
• Mediation versus Arbitration in India
• Mediation as a Profession in India
• Mediation Ethics in India
• Mediation in Criminal Disputes in India

Registration Procedure

1. Registration Link: Click here.
2. The registration fee for the competition is as follows:
   • Single Author: ₹ 1200
   • Co-authorship (two authors): ₹ 1800 (total)
   • Co-authorship (three authors): ₹ 2400 INR (total)

Award

• First prize: ₹ 10,000 cash + Felicitation at the Press Release of Indian Mediation Week (February 2019)
• Second Prize: ₹ 7,000 cash + Felicitation at the Press Release of Indian Mediation Week (February 2019)
• Third Prize: ₹ 5,000 cash + Felicitation at the Press Release of Indian Mediation Week (February 2019)
• First to Fifth Entries: Eligible to co-author a book on “The applicability of Mediation in Healthcare sector” to be published by Eastern Book Company

•  First to Fifteenth Entries: Top 15 entries shall be published on the ODRways website.
• First to Twentieth Entries: Eligible for participation in the internship screening process.
• All the entries will be recognized with a participation certificate.

How to apply?

• Entries may be submitted via email to imwessaycompetition@gmail.com. The last date to register for the competition is December 1, 2018 (Saturday). Please note that no application for registration shall be entertained after the deadline.
• Word Limit: 3,000 to 5,000 words (Exclusive of footnotes and abstract).
• Deadline:2359 hours, December 28, 2018 (Friday).

For any queries Email at imwessaycompetition@gmail.com ; or Avnish Kumar Singh: 7903629219. Anshuman Panigrahi: 9778888779. Apoorva Singh: 9918344934. Aastha Sharma: 8583973520. Aryan Mohindroo: 9073007085.

For Brochure click here

For Poster click here

For Submission Guidelines click here

For Evaluation criteria click here

The High Court of Kerala today dismissed a petition filed by National Ayyaappa Devotees Association and few others against the implementation of Supreme Court's judgment in Indian Young Lawyers Associaiton case, which permitted entry of women of all age groups to Sabarimala temple.

The petition was filed contending that the SC judgment was merely "declaratory in nature", without casting any positive obligation on the State Government to implement it. It was also stated that the PIL in the apex court was not filed by devotees and that the same was based on newspaper reports. Therefore, the petition contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court was 'per incuriam' and 'sub silentio' and not binding on Ayyappa devotees.

The Division Bench of Justices P R Ramachandra Menon and N Anilkumar held that the High Court cannot examine the scope and correctness of the Supreme Court judgment. The Division Bench also noted that the petitioners have already approached the Supreme Court filing a writ petition seeking to set aside the Sabarimala judgment. The petitioner has also sought review of the same. These petitions are to be considered by the SC next week.Regarding this the Court observed that the petitioners cannot pursue two parallel remedies before different courts simultaneously.

Petitioner's counsel Advocate Mathews Nedumpara submitted that the State Government has misunderstood the declaration given by SC and has adopted hasty measures to implement the judgment, which has resulted in converting Sabarimala into a "warzone". The judgment of the SC ,which is merely a declaratory one, is misunderstood to be one which requires its compliance and execution, as the SC did not issue any order or direction- the counsel submitted. The argument however did not weigh with the Court. The Court held that the issue can be addressed only by the SC. The Court also expressed its unhappiness with the statement made in the petition that "This Hon'ble Court too happened to be misled to construe the said judgment as one requiring compliance". The Court asked the Nedumpara as to the basis for making such a statement in the petition, upon which he conceded mistake. The Court also noted that the petition had technical defects as only one of the eight petitioners had attested the pleadings in the petition.

Clarifying that the Court was not expressing anything on the merits of the petition, the Court dismissed it, reserving the petitioners' liberty to move the apex court seeking remedies.

The Court observed that there was no law which empowered Court to issue directions to a  'thantri' regarding temple rituals and observances.

Today the High Court of Kerala dismissed a petition seeking directions to the 'Thantri' of Sabarimala temple to reduce the 'vratham'(penance period) from 41 days to 21 days to enable women to undertake pilgrimage to the temple.

The petitioner M K Narayanan Potti, who claimed to be a teacher and also author of many publications on temple rituals, said that he welcomed the SC judgment allowing women entry and there was need to formulate rituals and practises to facilitate women entry. According to him, the existing practise of 41 days of 'vratham' cannot be undertaken by women of fertile age group, and hence there was need to reduce the 'vratham' period. He submitted that there are several men who undertake the pilgrimage without strictly undertaking 41 days penance. According to him, the temple practises are not inflexible and can be changed by 'thantri' in tune with the evolving norms. However, the 'thantri' was not taking any initiative in that regard, and had taken an adamant stand that the temple will be shut down for purification ceremonies in the event of a woman of fertile age group visiting it. The petitioner, who appeared in person, stated that there was nothing in the 'shastras' which stated that women cannot be 'brahmacharis' and hence the rituals should be modified to enable women entry.

The Division Bench of Justice P R Ramahcandra  Menon and Justice  N Anilkumar noted that the basic premise of the petition that women cannot perform 41 days penance due to 'impurity' arising out of intervening menstruation was totally misconceived. The Division Bench invited the petitioner's attention to the fact that the SC had unequivocally declared in the Indian Young Lawyers Association case that menstruation cannot be considered as an impurity which prevents women from performing penance and undertaking pilgrimage. The Division Bench also observed that Justice Chandrachud had held in the SC judgment that exclusion of women on the notion of impurity due to menstruation amounted to untouchability.

Further, the Court observed that there was no law which empowered Court to issue directions to a 'thantri' regarding temple rituals and observances. The bench also asked the petitioner as to why he did not choose to intervene in the petition in the SC to apprise the Court of his suggestions.  While dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the SC was the appropriate forum to seek necessary clarifications and modifications in the judgment as the High Court was powerless to issue further directions regarding implementation of an SC decision.

The High Court of Kerala today admitted a Public Interest Litigation which seeks directions to constitute Internal Complaints Committee(ICC) within political parties, media and film production houses n accordance with the Prevention of Sexual Harassment At Workplaces Act 2013. Considering the PIL for admission, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Hrishikesh Roy and Justice Jayasankaran Nambiar issued notice to the respondents.

The PIL was filed by 'Centre for Constitutional Rights Research and Advocacy', which is stated to be an organization working on issues of women and children. The petition filed through Advocate Sandhya Raju states that political parties, media houses, film production sets etc. come within the definition of 'workplace' as per the 2013 Act. It submits that despite the passage of 5 years, no Internal Complaints Committee to deal with grievances of sexual harassment at workplace has been formed in these organizations. The non implementation of the Act was advancing gender discrimination and creation of hostile work environment. It is also highlighted that the Act mandates conduct of regular and periodic gender sensitization and awareness programs, which are not undertaken by most of the organizations.

Kerala Television Federation, Kerala Union of Working Journalists, Indian Newspaper Society, Film Employees Federation of Kerala,  BJP, Indian National Congress, CPI(M) etc. are arrayed as respondents in the PIL. It seeks directions to the State Government to ensure compliance of the provisions of the Act by the organizations.

Incidentally, the Court also considered today petitions filed by Women's Cinema Collective(WCC) seeking formation of ICC in the associations of actors, technicians and producers in the film field. The petitions of WCC were adjourned to November 26 for the counter-affidavits of respondents.

Read Petition