Seven Additional Judges of Gauhati High Court have been made permanent by a notification issued by the Central government.

The notification makes permanent the following judges:

1. Justice Lanusungkum Jamir
2. Justice Manash Ranjan Pathak
3. Justice Achintya Malla Bujor Barua
4. Justice Kalyan Rai Surana
5. Justice Prasanta Kumar Deka
6. Justice Nelson Sailo
7. Justice Ajit Borthakur

The notification was issued pursuant to a resolution passed by the Supreme Court collegium last month. The resolution had taken note of certain allegations received by the office of the Chief Justice of India, but had concluded that there was no prima facie substance in these complaints.

“Any news or discussions in programmes shall not be aired which are likely to jeopardize ongoing inquiries, investigations or trials.’

The Supreme Court of Pakistan on Thursday issued some important directives to   Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to regulate ‘media trial’ in sub-judice matters.

A three-judge bench headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan Mian Saqib Nisar said that any discussion on a matter which is sub-judice may be aired, but only to the extent that it is to provide information to the public which is objective in nature and not subjective, and no content, including commentary, opinions or suggestions about the potential fate of such sub-judice matter which tends to prejudice the determination by a court, tribunal, etc., shall be aired.

Suo motu proceedings were initiated by the court against ARY News anchor Arshad Sharif for his comments in a talk show ‘Power Play’, which were discussing court proceedings regarding the inquiry by FIA against former President Asif Ali Zardari.

Drawing assumptions, inferences and conclusions from evidence or the documents filed in a case and stepping into the shoes of a judge on broadcasted programmes may not only convict the accused in the eyes of the public regardless of whether he is ultimately exonerated by a Court, but certain comments or opinions may be voiced which could potentially instill bias and prejudice in the minds of the judges, particularly to those who are dealing with the sub judice matter, thereby violating the fundamental rights under Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution of the persons involved in such matter, the bench observed.

The court added that where the fate of sub-judice matters is being decided on public forums, not only the minds of the public are being influenced, but also potentially the minds of the judges seized of the sub-judice matter, and lawyers and investigators, etc. involved in such matter, this would obviously tend to prejudice the sub-judice matter.

The court also observed that law in India regarding protection of the right to fair trial and protection from prejudicial comments with regards to sub-judice matters, in some ways, is similar to the law in Pakistan. The bench also quoted judgments of Indian Supreme Court and some high courts in this regard.

Particularly referring to strong observations made against ‘media trial’ by the Supreme Court of India in R. K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court, the bench said: “While we may not share the strong views in the above quoted paragraph entirely, it is not uncommon for the media to sensationalize issues of public importance and deduce guilt before any substantial finding has been recorded regarding the person undergoing trial/investigation/inquiry, and where this results in the mere risk of a substantial danger of the judges seized of the matter no longer remaining impartial, the right to fair trial of the person facing trial/investigation is irreparably lost.”

The court issued these directives to Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA):

• The Code of Conduct ensures that the freedom of speech and the right to information (Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution) are protected, and at the same time provide that the discussion of sub judice matters must be conducted in a manner which does not negatively affect another person’s fundamental right to be dealt with in accordance with the law (Article 4 of the Constitution) and the right to fair trial and due process (Article 10A of the Constitution).
• All licensees should be sent a notice/reminder of their basic ethics and objectives, standards and obligations under the Code of Conduct, particularly Clause 4(10) thereof, in that, editorial oversight should be observed prior to the airing of all programmes and any programme, the subject or content of which is found or deemed to be in violation of the Code of Conduct in its true letter and spirit, should not be aired by the licensee;
• Any discussion on a matter which is sub-judice may be aired but only to the extent that it is to provide information to the public which is objective in nature and not subjective, and no content, including commentary, opinions or suggestions about the potential fate of such sub-judice matter which tends to prejudice the determination by a court, tribunal, etc., shall be aired;
• While content based on extracts of court proceedings, police records and other sources are allowed to the extent that they are fair and correct, any news or discussions in programmes shall not be aired which are likely to jeopardize ongoing inquiries, investigations or trials;
• In compliance with Clause 5 of the Code of Conduct, all licensees should strictly ensure that an effective delaying mechanism is in place for broadcasting live programmes to ensure stern compliance with the Code of Conduct and Articles 4, 10A and 204 of the Constitution;
• In compliance with Clause 17 of the Code of Conduct, an impartial and competent in-house Monitoring Committee shall be formed by each licensee, with intimation to PEMRA which shall be duty bound to ensure compliance of the Code of Conduct;
• With regards to the Monitoring Committee, we direct that licensees include (for each of its meetings) at least one practicing lawyer of at least 5 years or above practice, with adequate understanding of the law to advise the licensee regarding any potential violations of the Code of Conduct by programmes to be aired in the future;
• In compliance with Clause 20 of the Code of Conduct, each licensee shall be required to hold regular trainings of its officers, employees, staff, anchors, representatives etc. with regards to ensure compliance with the Code of Conduct with the schedule and agenda of these regular trainings to be intimated to PEMRA through the Monitoring Committee;
• If any licensee is found to have violated or failed to observe the Code of Conduct in its true letter and spirit, particularly Clause 4 of thereof, and/or Articles 4, 10A and 204 of the Constitution, strict and immediate action should be taken against such licensee in accordance with Section 33 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court or any High Court retains the power to take cognizance of the matter and shall exercise its powers under Article 204 ibid where such Court is of the opinion that it is appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case for it to do so.

The court also accepted the unconditional and unqualified apology tendered by the news anchor and warned him to be ‘extremely careful in the future’.

Read the Judgment Here

The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) on Monday refused to review a 2016 case brought by various broadband service providers challenging Federal Communications Commission (FCC) net neutrality protections from the Obama era.

The FCC was issued by the Obama administration in 2015 to protect principles of net neutrality, which require that all traffic on the internet should be treated equally. It prohibited broadband providers from blocking or slowing traffic and banned them from offering so-called fast lanes to companies willing to pay extra to reach consumers more quickly than competitors.

Before the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, various telecommunications companies, as well as independent providers, had essentially asserted that they operated more similarly to broadcast networks and should be allowed editorial discretion over the content they provide.

The judgment had, however, rejected such contentions, ruling, “Because a broadband provider does not—and is not understood by users to—'speak' when providing neutral access to Internet content as common carriage, the First Amendment poses no bar to the open Internet rules.”

In addition to enforcing net neutrality rules against blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization, the decision had also allowed FCC to continue regulating fixed and mobile broadband providers under the common carrier provisions in Title II of the Communications Act.

While the FCC was later reversed by President Trump's pick for FCC chairman, Ajit Pai by issuing the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, AT&T and broadband industry lobby groups were still trying to overturn court decisions that upheld the FCC order. Their win would have prevented future administrations from imposing a similarly strict set of rules.

Trump, in fact, supported the industry's case, asking the US Supreme Court to vacate the ruling. Lawyers for the FCC and Department of Justice (DOJ) had filed a brief in June this year (after the change of administration) with the Supreme Court, supporting the broadband industry's case.

The DOJ and the FCC had also noted that the case "appears to be moot" because of Pai's repeal of the net neutrality rules and that the future of net neutrality will be decided in a new case in which dozens of litigants sued Pai's FCC to reverse the repeal. However, instead of letting the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruling stand, the DOJ and FCC had argued that it shouldn't act as a precedent during the current litigation over Pai's repeal.

SCOTUS was now divided on the appeals, with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch arguing to grant certiorari and vacate the decision of the DC Circuit as it had been made moot by the FCC repeal. While Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the proceedings, the majority ultimately voted to deny certioari.

The Bombay High Court recently dismissed a petition demanding a direction to the State Government to frame a policy document outlining the rules for allotting permanent accommodation to the Judicial Officers who have put in 15 years of service.

The order was passed by a Bench comprising Justice BR Gavai and Justice MS Karnik on a petition filed by former journalist Ketan Tirodkar.

The court noted that Tirodkar was essentially trying to espouse the cause of Judicial Officers. It then went on to examine whether such a petition can be entertained.

It took note of the judgment in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, to highlight the fact that while the role of locus has been diluted, this can only be done for the benefit of a party which cannot approach the court due to social or economic constraints.

“No doubt that the Hon'ble Apex Court from the Judgment in the case of S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149 onwards has diluted the rule of locus. Public Interest Litigation at the behest of party which is not in a sense aggrieved party would also be entertained by this Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Not only that the Court may also act on an postcard addressed to the Court. However, such rule of locus would be diluted only when the party for whose benefit the Petition is said to be filed, for variety of reasons like the social or economic constraints is not in a position to approach this Court directly,” it explained.

The court then opined that “a class of Judicial Officers who have put in 15 years of service cannot be said to be socially or economically constrained, so as not to approach this Court for redressal of their grievance if in fact such a grievance exits.”

It, therefore, asserted that exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in this case, would “not be only transgressing our limitations under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but entering into the area of Judicial adventurism or judicial terrorism”.

The petition was thereafter dismissed.

The Delhi High Court has directed North Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) to pay a compensation of Rs 10 lakh to the parents of a 13-year-old boy who was electrocuted while at play in a public park in the year 2010.

Justice JR Midha directed NDMC to pay the compensation to the parents even as it and the other agencies like the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB), BSES Yamuna Power Ltd quarrelled over shouldering the liability with each agency washing its hands off any responsibility in maintaining safe public parks.

The court, however, held NDMC, as primarily liable to pay the compensation in the first instance to the petitioners and granted it liberty to initiate appropriate legal proceedings against DUSIB, BSES Yamuna Power Ltd and/or any other agency, in accordance with law.

In the said case, 13-year-old Amit Kumar was playing in Shiv Park at Punjabi Basti, Baljeet Nagar, Anand Parbat near his residence on July 12, 2010, when he received an electric shock from the metallic fencing erected around high mast pole which resulted in his death.

The police registered an FIR under Section 304A (causing death by negligence)/ 337 (causing hurt by endangering personal safety of others) IPC at Police Station Anand Parbat in which a charge sheet came to be filed against Sanjeev Sharma, JE (Electric), Karol Bagh Zone, MCD.

The Electrical Inspector conducted an inspection of the site on 16th August 2010 and submitted his report dated 20th September 2010 to the police. According to the report, the accident occurred because the joints in the electric supply leads were found naked and they had not been found insulated with any insulating material/tape and the metallic frame of the high mast light pole and fencing erected around the pole had not been earthed.

During the hearing on the petition moved by Amit’s parents, the NDMC filed a counter affidavit wherein it admitted having installed the high mast pole but went on to say that the wires in the park were maintained by respondent no.2, BSES and the accident was caused due to its negligence.

NDMC further said the alleged accident might have taken place due to the accumulation of rain water in the park and leakage in earthing of the main lines maintained BSES. The civic body even submitted that the petitioners were negligent in not stopping their child from going to park.

BSES, on the other hand, said it is only providing the electricity to NDMC for street light and high mast poles and LV mains and the maintenance of service lines and semi-high mast poles is the responsibility of NDMC.

DUSIB was also impleaded in the matter and said it was not responsible for the park.

After the court held the NDMC liable, the civic agency told the court in an affidavit that it has agreed to pay the compensation to the petitioners without prejudice to its rights and contentions with liberty to recover the same from DUSIB, BSES Yamuna Power Limited and/or any other authority in accordance with the law.

The court then fixed the amount of compensation at Rs 10 lakh by referring to various cases, including the case titled Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, wherein the Supreme Court had said, “Taking note of the facts and circumstances, the amount of compensation awarded in public law remedy cases, and the need to provide a deterrent, we are of the view that award of Rs. 10 lakhs in the case of persons aged above 20 years and Rs. 7.5 lakhs in regard to those who were 20 years or below as on the date of the incident, would be appropriate…”

In another case titled Chiranji Lal v. DDA which related to the death of an 11-year-old due to the falling of an iron gate of a DDA park on him,  a committee appointed by the Delhi High Court had recommended the payment of compensation of Rs.  10 lakh in death cases and Rs. 5 lakh in case of permanent disability.

It is to be noted that recently, in a similar case of death of a 14-year-old boy due to electrocution in a public park, a division bench of the Delhi High Court had held that victims of state’s negligence cannot be denied compensation because of a dispute between government agencies as to who was negligent.

Read the Judgment Here

Centre for Economy Development and Law invites motivated students and scholars to apply for full-time internships at the Centre, Government Law College Thrissur.

Name of the post: Research Internee

Areas of research:

The research shall be carried out under the broader discourses of

• Developmental Economics
• Political Economy
• National and International Trade and Economic Law, and
• Law and Development

Location: Thrissur, Kerala, although there may be assignments which may require travel to other places both in and out of Kerala.

No. of post: 2 (Two)

Job assignments from and report to: CED&L Director.

Term: 4 weeks from the date of appointment.

Remuneration: Certificates shall be issued on proper and prompt completion of the internship assignments and tasks.

Minimum Eligibility requirements:

• Graduate, Post Graduate, Research Students and any other candidate with strong research interest in the field of law, economics, political science, or development studies with serious research interest can apply.
• Proficiency in English both spoken and written. (Students intending to write in Malayalam will also be considered, provided the applicants undertake to submit typewritten Malayalam reports. Decisions of the Director shall be final.)
• Computer skills inclusive of basics such as typing, proper and prompt management of desktop, folders and files to more extensive usage of Ms Office high-end operations, file format conversions, internet and browsing knowledge and website management.

How to apply?

• Visit www.cedl.ac.in and apply online. Please note that CED&L is currently calling for full-time Research Internship (In-house) only.
• Other internships listed in the online application form are not open as of now.
• Apply before 30th November 2018.

For official notification click here

• Release of Moot Proposition: November 01, 2018
• Last Day to Register Online: December 01, 2018
• Last Day to Seek Clarification: December 05, 2018
• Release of Clarifications: December 06, 2018
• Release of Contact Details of Volunteers: December 20, 2018
• Last Date to Submit Memorials (E-mail): December 26, 2018
• Last Date to Submit Memorials (With Penalty): December 30, 2018
• Inaugural Session & Draw of Lots: January 04, 2019
• Preliminary Rounds: January 05, 2019
• Final Rounds followed by Valedictory Session: January 06, 2019

• Winning Team: The winning team of the final rounds which will be held on January 06^th, 2019 will win the prize amount of INR 45,000/- along with trophy & certificates.
• Runners-up Team: The team which contested against the winning team in the final rounds will win the prize amount of INR 30,000/- along with trophy & certificates.
• Best Memorial: The Memorials, which secure the highest marks based upon the cumulative marks of both the Memorials submitted, shall be adjudged as the “Best Memorial” and will win the prize amount of INR 10,000/- along with trophy & certificates.
• Best Researcher: The researcher securing highest marks in the researcher’s test will be adjudged as the “Best Researcher” and will win the prize amount of INR 5,000/- along with trophy & certificates.
• Best Student Advocate: The speaker securing the highest marks based upon the cumulative marks of the Preliminary Rounds of the Competition will be adjudged as the “Best Student Advocate” and will win the prize amount of INR 5,000/- along with trophy & certificates.
• All the participants will get a 06 months subscription of RostrumLegal Infinity worth Rs. 8950 Each.

On the occasion of the National Legal Services Day, Supreme Court judge and Executive Chairman of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) Justice Madan B. Lokur identified illiteracy as one of the main challenges in the materialization of the “constitutional vision” of equal justice and equality in access to justice as envisaged in Article 39A.

Speaking on national radio, he explained that though the Legal Services Authority Act was passed in 1987, it was enforced on November 9, 1995 and hence, the significance of the day-

“In the last 25 years, advice and assistance has been extended to the disabled, the poor, women and children. More than 8,000 lawyers and 65,000 paralegal volunteers are associated and in the past year, 900 legal aid service camps and several awareness programmes have been carried out to sensitize the people of their constitutional rights....there are even door-to-door campaigns”

He assured that the remote areas are not deprived of the benefits of these programmes, awareness initiatives recently having been initiated in Ladakh and the Tea Garden in Assam.

“We have a helpline- ‘15100’- which one can call at anytime for any information or aid. Details of our schemes are also available on the NALSA website. In addition to this, brochures are distributed at all our awareness camps”

“Before the Legal Aid Services Act, the Supreme Court and the government of India had formed a committee by which the Lok Adalats were brought into being. For small matters, even if a case is in court but an early redressal is sought, the parties may go to these Lok Adalats. In the last year, as many as 38 lakh cases which never came to court, what we call ‘pre-litigation’, were resolved through the Lok Adalats. Now there are also permanent Lok Adalats for disputes pertaining to water, electricity and other public utilities”, advanced the judge.

“There is also an endeavour to try and settle disputes between neighbours or those of the nature of road rage even outside of Lok Adalats, by way of mediation”, he continued.

Justice Lokur threw light on the special provisions in respect of heinous crimes such as rape and acid attack-

“one, we offer free legal aid to the women and two, there are schemes like the victim compensation scheme. The victims may apply to the nearest Legal Services Authority at the district or even the Taluka level. Last year, almost Rs. 123 crores were allotted as compensation....”

The judge proceeded to discuss the facility of free legal services through legal clinics in jails, reaching out to over two lakh prisoners in the last year, besides the digitisation of several jails over the past year-

“we go to jails and inform people of their constitutional rights, such as that of filing an appeal. One may inquire about their cases or our schemes at the front office of the legal aid clinics”

On NALSA’s focus on holding legal literacy clubs in schools and colleges, the judge weighed in that the Authority was guided by the same rationale which had a few years ago led the apex court to mandate environmental education in schools and colleges- to educate students about their rights, about legal aid and to encourage them to be a part of the movement.

Further, Justice Lokur said that free legal aid being offered since the last 23 years, NALSA has last week decided to have an external entity perform an impact assessment study, so far as the efficacy of the advocates, the paralegal volunteers, the schemes and services is concerned. Moreover, there are plans to reinforce the training of lawyers, paralegals and others who assist in the legal aid and awareness camps. Finally, the Authority is looking to incorporate technology in pursuing its objectives, including video conferencing and the social media platforms of Facebook and Twitter to spread awareness on constitutional rights.

The judge made a mention of the Pilot project commenced in Kargil and Leh where the State Authority has been entrusted with the task of assisting the litigants in representing their cases before the J & K High Court.

“Free legal aid and advice is your right and NALSA wants you to have it. Regardless of whether the matter is big or small, do not hesitate in availing of this right. Please take advantage of our schemes and programmes”, urged Justice Lokur as he signed off.

Supreme Court judge, Justice KM Joseph recently emphasized on the need for “cooperative Federalism” for India to become a “naturally indestructible formation”.

“Both the Centre and the States must imbibe a genuine spirit of co-operative Federalism, if not collaborative Federalism. There can be no Centre without States. The States are integrated into one nation, both based on social, economic and political rationale but a liberal give and take policy followed by the Centre and the States is indispensable for the continued evolution of the federal system and its blossoming, and Bharat becoming a naturally indestructible formation,” he said.

Justice Joseph was delivering the Justice VR Krishna Iyer Memorial Law lecture on ‘Federalism in India-Past, Present and Future’. The lecture, that was presided over by Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Chief Justice, High Court of Kerala, was succeeded by the distribution of the Third Justice VR Krishna Iyer Memorial Legal Literary Award for Lawyers.

Justice Joseph began his address by remembering Justice Krishna Iyer as someone who combined top-class intellect with compassion, and never shied away from speaking out loud and clear on behalf of the oppressed, depressed and the poor.

“Whether you agreed with him or not you could neither silence him nor ignore him,” he rightly added.

He embarked on elaborating on the superiority of qualities possessed by Justice Iyer, saying, “To cap it all, he was the most brilliant orator I have ever heard. His words flowed like the Nayagra Falls. Millennia down the line awestruck the generations will continue to grapple with the ideas and ideals that he have come to represent. Justice Iyer is a star which will continue to illuminate the world for ever and it will never become a black hole.”

Justice Joseph then spoke about Federalism, detailing modern Federalism as it prevails in other countries, as well as tracing its roots in India. He went on to emphasise on such collaboration in making treaties, levying taxes and in other institutions such as the All India Services.

As for ways to advance cooperative federalism, Justice Joseph gave examples and solutions. For instance, he said that signing of treaties and international agreements affecting the constituents in States must be preceded by consultation with the affected parties or at least the States. Further, he said that the Governor and the Central Government must frame definite time frames on decisions on Bills which are submitted for their consideration, and must abide by these limits.

He asserted that it is equally important for the State Governments to “act with the utmost responsibility”, and that there can be no room for secessionist demands. He added,

“They should refrain from doing anything which weakens the Centre. Without a strong Centre the States would be left high and dry and would not be able to fend for themselves.”

He also expressed hope that if Niti Ayog meets, as often as it is required to and there are meaningful deliberations where the Centre and the States discuss the matters as equal partners, a new era of cooperative or collaborative Federalism could dawn in India.

Nevertheless, he expressed certainty over the fact that Federalism as it exists, will strengthen democracy in India and the vision of the founding father will be achieved, provided that:

“But this requires, that all section of society and particularly there is politics, holders of constitutional parities and all public servants besides the common man working hand in hand and with utmost dedication and selflessly.”

Read the full text of speech here

The Bombay High Court on Tuesday constituted an ad-hoc committee to look after day-to-day functioning of the Mumbai Cricket Association.

The committee comprises of Professor Dr. Umesh Khanwilkar, Mr. Navin Shetty, Mr. Shahalam Shaikh, Mr. Ganesh Iyer, and CEO Mr.C.S.Naik. Dr. Khanvilkar and Mr. Naik have been appointed as the authorised signatories to operate the bank account of the association jointly.

Justice Sandeep K. Shinde directed this committee to submit an audited statement of income and expenditure with particulars to the court quarterly.

The court had, in April this year, appointed a committee of administrators, comprising former Supreme Court judge, Justice HL Gokhale, and former Bombay High Court judge, Justice VM Kanade. They had, however, expressed their unwillingness to continue as administrators after expiry of their term.

The court was now hearing an application filed by the city cricket body seeking appointment of a panel which could take financial and other administrative decisions. This was a week after the court refused to interfere in the BCCI's decision to shift a one-day international match between India and West Indies from the MCA-run Wankhede Stadium to Brabourne Stadium of the Cricket Club of India.

The Association had essentially highlighted the lack of any responsible person or committee to manage its administrative affairs. The court noted, “It is brought to the notice of this Court that Association has to defray day­ to ­day expenses and pay the statutory dues like professional tax, provident fund of its employees. 

Besides, remuneration and salary is payable to its employees and coaches. Schedule of monthly expenses at page 195 shows there are 61 permanent employees of the Association besides, contract employees. Every month Association has to spend about 83,48,000/­. As on today in the absence of committee association is unable to pay statutory dues including the salaries of its permanent employees for want of authority. In other words, entire affairs of the association has come to stand­still.”

Advocate AS Khandeparkar, appearing for the petitioner association, had therefore submitted that there was a need for appointing an ad-hoc Managing Committee of five members, who are otherwise eligible to be appointed as members of the Managing Committee of the Association, along with its CEO, to discharge the day-to-day administrative functions of the Association.

Accepting his suggestion, the court ordered, “…the committee as constituted hereinabove shall look after day­-to­-day administrative functions of the Association and shall not take any major policy decision without first obtaining leave of this Court.”

Read the Order Here

‘This 5% reservation of seats has to be provided each time when process for filling up the seats is initiated by the above-mentioned institutions.’

The Himachal Pradesh High Court has directed all institutions of higher education and other higher educational institutions receiving aid from the state government to reserve not less than 5% seats for persons with benchmark disabilities.

The bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, in a suo motu writ petition, observed that the said reservation to the extent of 5% shall be provided each time when the institutions initiate the process of admission to academic courses and there shall be no carrying forward of seats so reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities nor a running roster in this regard shall be maintained by the institutions.

The high court had taken note of grievance raised by a student, Indu Kumari, who was denied admission in M.A. (Political Science) in Himachal Pradesh University, as the university was providing only 3% reservation to the disabled students as per the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.

The court said the new Act viz., the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, is to be implemented in true letter and spirit in all higher educational institutions and other higher education institutions receiving aid from the government.

The bench remarked: “We are of the considered view that the reservation in educational institutions, as is provided under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and further the directions, which stand issued by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Disabled Rights Group and another Vs. Union of India and others (supra), leave no room of doubt that in all Government institutions of higher education, as also other higher educational institutions receiving aid from the Government, not less than 5% seats have to be reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities. This 5% reservation of seats has to be provided each time when process for filling up the seats is initiated by the above-mentioned institutions. There can be no running roster and for each academic session, fresh roster has to be prepared, earmarking number of seats which are to be reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities, in view of the total seats available.”

The Central Government on Friday notified the appointment of Chief Justices for four high courts of the country.

The following appointments were notified:

• Justice Govind Mathur has been appointed as the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court.

Justice Mathur practiced in the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in Constitutional, Service and Labour matters after this enrolment. He has also served as the standing counsel for various entities including the University of Rajasthan, Indian Oil Corporation, Water and Power Consultancy Services, New Delhi, Central Bank of India, and Punjab National Bank. He was transferred to the Allahabad High Court in November last year and took charge as the court’s Acting Chief Justice on October 24, 2018.

• Justice Sanjay Kumar Seth has been appointed as the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court.

Justice Seth enrolled as an advocate in June, 1981, and practiced on civil and constitutional sides in the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur. He was appointed as a judge of the High Court in March, 2003 and was made permanent in January, 2004.

• Justice Amreshwar Pratap has been appointed as the Chief Justice of Patna High Court.

Justice Pratap obtained his law degree in 1985 and enrolled as an advocate the same year. He was elevated as an Additional Judge in September, 2004, and took oath as a Permanent Judge in August, 2005.

• Justice Sanjay Karol has been appointed as the Chief Justice of Tripura High Court.

Justice Karol enrolled with the Bar in 1986 and was designated as a Senior Advocate in 1999. He was elevated as a judge of the High Court in March 2007, and assumed charge as the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court from 25 April 2017 till 5 October 2018

Read the Notifications Here

The Centre has notified the transfer of Justice Ravi Ranjan from Patna High Court to Punjab and Haryana High Court.

The resolution to transfer him was passed on October 29, after which Justice Ranjan was requested to send his response to the same. He had then requested to stay the proposal of his transfer or to accommodate him in nearby High Courts of Jharkhand or Allahabad instead.

The collegium, however, did not consider it possible to accede to his request and had reiterated its recommendation.

“The Collegium has carefully gone through the aforesaid representation and taken into consideration all relevant factors including the request of Dr. Justice Ravi Ranjan for staying his transfer to Punjab & Haryana High Court and, in the alternative, to transfer him to Jharkhand High Court or Allahabad High Court. On reconsideration, the Collegium is of the considered view that it is not possible to accede to either of his requests. The Collegium accordingly reiterates its recommendation dated 29th October, 2018 for transfer of Dr. Ravi Ranjan to Punjab & Haryana High Court,” the resolution had said.

Justice Ranjan did his LL.B course from Patna Law College in 1989 and joined the Patna High Court Bar in December, 1990. He was elevated as an Additional Judge of Patna high Court in July, 2008 and was made permanent in January, 2010.

Read the Notification Here  

Acting promptly on a case involving a student’s career, the Chhattisgarh High Court recently admitted, heard and disposed of a case within a day.

The case was heard by Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, who was quick to rule in favour of the petitioner, Amit Saha.

Saha had initially been informed that he had failed his final exams with a mere 11 marks for his final semester at the Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical Education University. It was only through a second re-evaluation that he was found to have passed his exams with 41 marks.

The University nevertheless denied him admission to the BE course, owing to the last date for admission having already passed by the time he applied in October.

Saha then approached the High Court through Advocates Prakash Tiwari and Palesh Tiwari. The case was filed on October 15, and the matter was mentioned before the court on the same day.

Noting that the petition “involves the career and one precious year of the petitioner”, Justice Mishra heard and disposed of the matter the very next day, ruling that Saha could not be blamed for the delay in applying for the course.

The court highlighted the fact that the result for final semester of the diploma course was declared on June 22, much before August 15— the last date for admissions to the BE course. It then noted that if Saha’s answer-sheet had been evaluated properly, he would’ve qualified for admission to the BE course on June 22.

“Situation would have been different if the result of some other examination was declared after 15th August 2018. Here is a case where the result was declared on 22nd June, 2018 and the result of re-revaluation is part of that result, which was originally declared on 22nd June, 2018. Equity jurisdiction of the Court would therefore come to the rescue of the petitioner,” it explained.

The court then directed the University and the state government to consider recommending Saha for admission in the concerned discipline. In case he is found to be qualified, they were directed to grant him admission in BE (3rd semester), according to the Rules.

The entire process was directed to be completed on or before November 12.

The Bombay High Court has upheld the validity of the Maharashtra Tax on Lotteries Act, 2006 and held that lottery comes under the purview of betting and gambling.

The division bench of Justice SC Dharmadhikari and Justice BH Dangre ruled that the state is empowered to levy tax on betting and gambling. Also, that the state government is empowered to prohibit or restrict within its state the sale of lottery tickets of any other state.

Case Background

The bench was hearing a writ petition filed by Sri Mangal Murty Marketing, a sub-distributor of state-organized lottery of Government of Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland. The petitioner sought the Maharashtra Tax on Lotteries Act to be declared void, being ultra vires to the provisions of the Constitution.

Also, a direction was sought to restrain the state levying and/or collecting tax on the sale of lottery tickets in Maharashtra. The said writ petition was admitted on June 27, 2007, and an interim direction was issued to the effect that the State shall not levy or collect any taxes from the petitioner and it shall not obstruct the petitioner as long as it is carrying on lawful business.

The said petition was disposed of in an order dated November 29, 2016, in view of the fact that the challenge in the writ petition was already covered by a judgment delivered by the division bench of Justice DK Deshmukh and  Justice RS Mohite in the case of N.V. Marketing Pvt. Ltd vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors decided on August 14, 2009.

However, a review petition along with an application for condonation of delay was filed. The court, on March 23, 2017, condoned the delay and was also pleased to restore the writ petition to its file.  This order came to be passed when it was noted that a division bench in the High Court of Karnataka had delivered a judgment in a case filed in the High Court of Karnataka and one of the judges was Justice Manjula Chellur (who later became the Chief Justice of Bombay High Court) who was a party to the said judgment. The said division bench of the High Court of Karnataka had taken a divergent view to the decision delivered by the Bombay High Court.

Thus, the said writ petition was restored to file.

Submissions

Senior Advocate PS Raman appeared on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that the Maharashtra Tax on Lotteries Act is nothing but another attempt by the government to attempt to restrict/prohibit the sale of lottery tickets of other states in the state of Maharashtra.

He further submitted that lottery is a subject included in the Union List, therefore, the state did not have the legislative competence to bring in such a law. In exercise of its power, the Parliament has already enacted the Lottery Regulation Act, 1998 to regularize the conduct of lottery business in respect of the State Organized lotteries and with a view to offer security to the purchaser of lottery tickets, Raman said.

Raman also questioned the judgment of the high court in NV Marketing, he relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in H. Anraj vs. State of Maharashtra, holding that the state-organized lotteries and the lotteries are excluded from the expression “betting and gambling” in List II in Entry 34 and put in Entry 40 of List I of   Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

Advocate General AA Kumbhakoni sought to draw a distinction between entries in the seventh schedule relating to taxation and entries related to regulation. He submitted that the Lotteries (Regulation) Act 1998, was enacted by the Parliament to regulate the lotteries and to provide the matters connected therewith.  However, this does not cover the element of taxation, Kumbhakoni said. He told the Court that the Maharashtra Tax on Lotteries Act provides for the levy and collection of tax on the lotteries and this enactment authorizes the State to levy and collect tax on lotteries of the State as well as lotteries of other States which are conducted as per provisions of Lotteries (Regulation) Act 1998.

Judgment

The court accepted the Advocate General’s submissions and agreed with the decision of the division bench in NV Marketing:

“We do not find any error in the observations of the Division Bench which is based on the foundation that since lottery is gambling, Entry 62 of List II gets attracted. We are in agreement with the learned Advocate   General who had canvassed before us the submissions that the fields of legislation in the entries either in the Union List or in the State List are distinct when it provides for taxation and when it intends to confer a power of Regulation. List I of Entry 40 which authorizes the Parliament to regulate the lotteries organized by the Government of India or Government of a Sate necessarily do not cover a taxing element.”

The court further held that lottery comes under the purview of betting and gambling:

“We do not find any flaw in the observation of the Division Bench when it proceeds to hold that lottery falls within the purview of betting.

The State Government is empowered to prohibit or restrict within its State the sale of lottery tickets of any other State. The State has invoked Entry 62 of List II while enacting the impugned legislation. This entry   specifically empowers the State to tax on betting and gambling.”

Thus, the petition was dismissed.

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Indraprastha Gas Limited (IGL) has agreed to takeover the supply of natural gas in Gurugram as an ongoing concern from the Haryana City Gas Distribution Limited (HCGDL), in a long-pending dispute oversupply of natural gas in Gurugram.

IGL had challenged the Petroleum and Natural Regulatory Board’s decision to allow HCGDL’s operations in Gurugram, asserting that IGL had been granted permission for the same back in 2004, much before the Regulatory Board had been constituted.

In a recent order, a Bench comprising Justice MB Lokur, Justice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice Deepak Gupta noted that IGL and HCGDL have agreed to a suggestion put forth by Additional Solicitor General, ANS Nadkarni.

The court noted, “During the course of hearing, learned Additional Solicitor General suggested that it might be worth considering whether the supply of natural gas by Haryana City Gas Distribution Limited (HCGDL) can be taken over by Indraprastha Gas Limited (IGL) in Gurgaon District as an ongoing concern so that the entire dispute can be resolved amicably.

Learned counsel for HCGDL and learned counsel for IGL are agreeable to this suggestion given by learned Additional Solicitor General.”

During the hearing, the court was also informed that the parties had agreed that the valuation of the ongoing concern, including the infrastructure, be undertaken by an independent valuer such as Deloitte Haskins and Sells LLP.

Accepting this submission, a copy of the order was directed to be furnished to Deloitte Haskins and Sells LLP by the counsel for the parties, with a request to provide the valuation within four weeks and in any case by November 30. The expenses to be incurred by Deloitte Haskins and Sells LLP were directed to be borne equally by IGL and HCGDL.

The matter will next be heard on December 6.

IGL was represented by Advocates Saurav Agrawal, Hitabhilash Mohanty, Anshuman Chowdhury, Satyawan Shekhawat and Bimal Roy Jad. HCGDL was represented by Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra and Advocates KV Mohan, Sanjeet Singh and KV Balakrishnan.

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The Delhi High Court recently absolved Station House Officer PS Mayur Vihar, Inspector Manoj Kumar Sharma of contempt charges, while directing the Delhi Police to refrain from filing status reports in a “casual” and “cavalier” manner.

A Bench comprising Justice Siddharth Mridul and Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal ordered, “…officials of the Delhi Police are required to be held to the high standards by which they profess their conduct to be judged. In view of the foregoing, it is incumbent upon this Court to direct the concerned SHO, as well as, other officials of the Delhi Police to exercise caution, care and diligence while responding to proceedings pending adjudication before the Court…

…The officers of the Delhi Police are directed to eschew from filing status reports in a casual and cavalier manner.”

The court was hearing a criminal contempt petition initiated on a reference received from a learned Single Judge of the court. The SHO had landed in trouble while the Single Judge was hearing a petition filed by a woman seeking directions to remove derogatory remarks made against her and her community by a post on Facebook.

On notice being issued on the woman’s petition, a status report was filed on August 27, by Mr. Sharma. As per the report, the request for removal of the post was made on August 16. It said that the post was then examined and a letter was sent to Facebook through Cyber Cell, East District, Delhi to remove the content.

In view of this status report, the court had directed the State to file a status report specifying whether the content had been successfully removed. The second affidavit, filed on September 14 under the signature of the same police officer, had assured the court that the content had been removed from Facebook.

However, the counsel for the petitioner had then pointed out that the police officer’s statement was incorrect as the post resurfaces if certain words were typed. The court had then directed the in-charge of the Cyber Cell to appear before it.

The in-charge had told the court that the first communication for removal of the post was received by him only on September 12, that too with the wrong URL number. The correct URL, he said, was received by him only on September 14.

Pointing out the discrepancy, the police officer was asked to explain his stand, to which he had claimed that the earlier affidavit contained an “inadvertent and bonafide language error”, and had also apologised for the same.

The Single Judge had nevertheless noted that the police officer had concealed information from it and had also submitted incorrect facts. It had then directed initiation of contempt proceedings against the officer.

The Division Bench, however, now opined that while the SHO’s report could be said to misdirect the proceedings, they did not constitute a deliberate and wilful attempt to mislead the court or interfere in the administration of justice. It further noted that he had apologised at the first opportunity and had “expressed appropriate remorse” for having misdirected the court.

The notice of criminal contempt issued against him was therefore discharged, with a direction for him to exercise due caution, henceforth.

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Ten years after the death of her husband, a lady’s appeal against divorce decree granted by the family court has been allowed by the Delhi High Court.

In 2007, the family court had dissolved their marriage observing that they had reached to a point of no return and their marriage had broken down irretrievably. The wife filed an appeal against this and in 2008, the husband expired. He was represented in the proceedings by his father.

In her appeal, the wife’s contention was that the family court did not take into account the factum that he had withdrawn her consent to the grant of the decree of mutual consent and that she, having refused to participate in the same, cannot now be compelled to accept a divorce through mutual consent in as much as the mutuality to the consent does not exist.

Perusing the records of this case, Justice Anu Malhotra observed that the element of mutual consent have not continued at the stage of proceedings under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955  when the decree of divorce was granted, no such decree of divorce under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as amended, as granted vide the impugned order, could have been granted.

The court said: “In the absence of the continued mutual consent a decree of divorce under Section 13 B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as amended cannot be granted as laid down in Smruti Pahariya Vs. Sanjay Pahariya and from the absence of one of the parties before the Trial Court, the presumption of consent for divorce cannot be attributed to that party as consent needs to continue till the date of the decree of divorce under Section 13B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as amended and the Court has the statutory obligation to hear the parties to ascertain their consent which was clearly not done in the instant case, the appellant not even being present on the date 06.10.2007 i.e. the date of the decree of divorce granted through mutual consent.”

Observing that emotional outburst of a disgruntled employee is part of free speech, the High Court of Kerala ordered the reinstatement of a University employee who was suspended for his social media posts against the institution.

The Court was acting on a petition filed by a University Assistant of Mahatma Gandhi University, who posted sarcastic comments in social media following his removal from the membership of University Employees Association. Though his comments did not specifically refer to the institution or its officials, taking his outcry as a veiled attack on it, the University placed him under suspension. Challenging the suspension as vengeful, the petitioner approached the High Court.

The University defended its decision stating that his posts were a call to other employees to rebel against it and that the posts had tarnished the prestige of the institution.

Considering the petition, Justice Muhamed Mustaque observed "Emotional outburst of a disgruntled, through social media in a louder voice is part of his right of free speech. In certain circumstances, there are chances that such public outburst would intersect with the Institution's interest"

The Court opined that the thoughts of the petitioner resembled the sentiments expressed by Charlie Chaplin in his autobiography that "My prodigious sin was, and still is, being a non-conformist"

It was also held that discipline and servitude were not the same and that no authority should expect one to be silent.

"Discipline and servitude are to be distinguished. If an employee speaks out in the social media in a general perspective which is not inconsistent with the collective interest of the Institution, that is part of his right of free speech. No authority should expect one to be silent. Survival of public Institution depends upon how it accounts for democratic values. Free expression is the corner stone of democratic value. Every functionary of public power therefore, must command liberty to their constituents", Justice Mustaque stated in the judgment.

At the same time, the Court added that freedom of expression was not absolute and that when the individual right of an employee becomes repugnant to the collective interest of the Institution, the individual must fall within the lines of collective interest. "If such expressions breach the limit or boundary and it entrench to tarnish the prestige of the Institution, such tendency must be desisted through actions", observed the judgment.

The Court however refrained from expressing anything on whether the posts of the petitioner crossed the line amounting to misconduct.  The Court agreed that it was a matter for inquiry. However, the continued  suspension of the employee(which had crossed 60 days on the date of judgment) was held to be unjustifiable.  The impugned posts were already in public domain and there was no chance of the petitioner interfering with the materials against him. So, the inquiry against him will not be prejudiced if he is reinstated. On the basis of the principle that suspension cannot be used as a weapon to penalise, the Court ordered his reinstatement.

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The word “impotent” when understood in its plain and grammatical sense, reflects adversely upon the manhood of a person and has a tendency to invite derisive opinions about such person from others

The Bombay High Court has held that calling a husband ‘impotent’ in pleadings can amount to ‘defamation’.

A defamation complaint was filed by a husband alleging that his wife made some statements casting aspersions on his potency, in a writ petition filed by her before the high court. Summons issued by the magistrate to the wife was challenged before the high court.

The high court rejected the contention put forth by counsel appearing for the wife that whenever an allegation made in litigation is found to be true, it does not amount to defamation within the meaning of Section 499 of IPC. It was also contended that when the complaint is founded on an allegation in a plaint filed in a civil proceeding and has been found to be false, the offence would not be that of defamation punishable under Section 500 of IPC, but an offence relating to giving of false evidence punishable under Section 193 of IPC.

In this regard, Justice SB Shukre observed: “The offence is essentially of something which is a matter of evidence or law and not of pleadings. If any defamatory statement is made in pleadings, what would arise would be an offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 read with Section 499 of IPC and not of offence of giving false evidence punishable under Section 193 read with Section 191 of IPC.”

The counsel also contended that by the term ‘impotent’, what the wife meant was that due to some medical problem of the husband, the conception of the child was not possible.

Rejecting the said contention, the court observed: “Even if the expression “impotent person”, as the learned Counsel for the applicant would like this Court to do, is read in all its contextual setting, in particular, in the context of the birth of the child by adopting a medical procedure on the suggestion of the Gynecologist, still the apparent harm that the expression “impotent person” causes, is not diluted or washed out. This is for the reason that prima facie the word “impotent” when understood in it's plain and grammatical sense, reflects adversely upon the manhood of a person and has a tendency to invite derisive opinions about such person from others and, therefore, use of such word and its publication as contemplated under Section 499 of IPC would be sufficient to constitute, in a prima facie manner, the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of IPC. Now, if the non-applicant submits that this word has been used by her in some different sense denoting condition of the non-applicant affecting the process of conception, it would be a matter of evidence to be proved accordingly. At this stage, the meaning apparently indicated by the word would have to be taken as it is. Then, such imputation has been made by filing a writ petition and, therefore, the other ingredient of publication is also fulfilled in the present case. Therefore, prima facie, the offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC is made out in this case.”

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